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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880161 
Priority No. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Ralph Menzies relies on his opening 
brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the statements of 
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts.1 Appellant 
replies to those issues set forth below. Issues not addressed in 
this reply brief are adequately discussed in Appellant's opening 
brief. 
Throughout its brief, the State urges this Court to resolve 
a number of issues by holding that the issue was not properly 
preserved in the trial court or was otherwise waived. 
This Court has limited the concept of "waiver" of an 
argument by defense counsel as it applies to capital cases. In 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987), this Court stated: 
The State responds to a number of defendant's 
claims of reversible error by urging this Court 
not to consider or rule on such claims because 
1. The State has outlined facts in bold face in its brief which it 
claims were not outlined by Appellant in his opening brief. Many of 
those facts are in fact included in Appellant's opening brief. See, 
e.g., State's brief at 11 ("I just want to speak to my husband"); 
Appellant's brief at 110 ("I just want to talk with my husband"); 
State's brief at 16 ("he did not expect to see the very car he had 
seen at Storm Mountain"), Appellant's brief at 104 (Tim told 
officers that he did not think the car would be the same car he saw 
at Storm Mountain). 
they were inadequately preserved at trial. We 
decline to adopt that approach and instruct the 
State to hereafter brief all issues on their 
merits in death penalty cases. 
This Court further explained that it will review all issues 
raised on appeal in a capital case on their merits, and will reverse 
a conviction where the errors are manifest and prejudicial. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d at 553; see also State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 
1022 (Utah 1989). 
In addition, resolution of issues raised by Appellant on 
grounds of waiver is not appropriate in this case, given the 
inaccuracies in the transcript.2 Given the way in which the 
transcript was prepared in this case and the fact that this is a 
capital case in which the state is seeking to impose the death 
penalty, the State's heavy reliance on waiver as a means of 
resolving the substantive issues should not be embraced by this 
Court.3 
2. A number of different Assistant Attorneys General, including 
S. Sjogren, D. Larsen, B. Bearnson, C. Soltis, C. Barlow, and 
current attorney of record, J. F. Voros, Jr., have been assigned to 
this case since the Notice of Appeal was filed. Defense counsel 
recalls a then assigned Assistant Attorney General being asked by 
this Court whether the State intended to argue waiver in this case 
in light of the difficulties with the record, and State's counsel 
responding that she did not believe the State would advance such an 
argument in this case. Appellate counsel has been unable to locate 
a tape recording of this hearing. Although current counsel for the 
State was not assigned to this case at that time, and this Court has 
since issued its opinion on the transcript issue, this exchange 
should be kept in mind in reviewing the State's ubiquitous waiver 
arguments in this case. 
3. Appellant requests that this Court review all issues on their 
merits. See Tillman, 750 P.2d at 553. Appellant will not repeat 
this discussion regarding the minimal role of "waiver" doctrine in a 
capital case throughout this brief and incorporates this argument in 
all sections where the State has argued that an issue should not be 
reviewed because it was not properly raised in the trial court. 
- 2 -
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The applicable standards of review are set forth in 
Appellant's opening brief at 1-10. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point II. Challenges for Cause 
The responses of the jurors in the present case were 
comparable to or more biased than the responses of the juror who 
should have been removed for cause in State v. Young, 850 P.2d 327, 
395-6, 417, 418 (Utah 1993). The jurors were not adequately 
rehabilitated and should have been removed for cause. This Court 
has repeatedly held that reversible error occurs where a defendant 
is required to use a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who 
should have been removed for cause. This proposition was recently 
unanimously reaffirmed in Young, 853 P.2d at 343, 395-6. The State 
fails to offer any compelling argument for overruling this recent 
precedent. 
Point III. Discovery Violation: Post-Lineup Query 
A motion to continue was not required where defense counsel 
learned of the discovery violation during the course of the trial. 
A continuance would not have remedied the harm caused by the 
violation. The trial court correctly concluded that a discovery 
violation occurred as the result of the State's failure to provide 
defense counsel with information regarding the post-lineup query 
made by a key witness. 
Point IV. Discovery Violation: Inability to Select Photograph 
Larabee's initial inability to select a photograph was 
exculpatory evidence which the State should have conveyed to defense 
- 3 -
counsel prior to trial. 
Point V. Preliminary Hearing Testimony of Britton 
The confrontation clause was implicated in this case where 
Britton did not appear before the trier of fact. The trial judge 
erroneously determined that Britton was unavailable and that the 
former testimony was reliable. 
Point XVII. Prison File; Due Process and Confrontation Violation 
The multitude of unreliable double and triple hearsay 
information in the file violated Appellant's right to due process 
and the eighth amendment. The right to confrontation applies in the 
penalty phase and was violated by the admission of the prison file. 
In addition, admission of disciplinary reports violated Appellant's 
right to due process and against self-incrimination. 
Point XVIII. Unadjudicated Conduct 
The prison file contained allegations of unadjudicated 
criminal conduct which the State did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt, in violation of due process and the eighth amendment. 
Point IXX. Discovery Violation 
The State's failure to provide defendant with a copy of the 
prison file requires a new penalty hearing. 
Point XX. Self-incrimination 
Admission of Appellant's statements in the prison file 
violated Appellant's rights against self-incrimination. 
Point XXVII. Heinousness Aqqravator 
The trial judge improperly applied the heinousness 
aggravating circumstance, requiring a new penalty phase. 
- 4 -
Point XXIX, Pecuniary Gain Aggravating Circumstance 
The trial judge improperly applied the pecuniary gain 
aggravating circumstance, requiring a new penalty hearing. 
Point XXX. Uncharged Aggravating Circumstance 
Reliance on uncharged aggravating circumstance not argued 
by the State requires a new penalty hearing. 
Point XXXI. Rap Sheets 
The juvenile and adult rap sheets were unreliable and 
inadmissible evidence which the trial judge relied on, in violation 
of due process and the eighth amendment. 
Point XXXII. Gruesome Photographs 
The trial judge erroneously admitted gruesome photographs 
which had little if any relevance. 
Point XXXIII. Possibility of Parole 
The trial judge improperly relied on the possibility of 
parole in determining sentence. 
Point XXXV. Possibility of Escape 
The trial judge improperly relied on the possibility of 
escape in determining sentence. 
Point XXXVI. Improper Prosecutorial Argument 
Improper penalty phase argument by the prosecutor requires 
a new hearing. 
Point XXXVII. Victim Impact Evidence 
Victim impact evidence was improperly considered. 
Point XXXVIII. Dr. Smith's Testimony 
Dr. Smith' testimony was unreliable. 
- 5 -
Point XXXXI. Disproportionate Sentence 
Imposition of the death penalty was disproportionate. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN FAILING TO REMOVE JURORS FOR CAUSE. 
After the opening brief was filed in the instant case, a 
majority of this Court held in State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 395-6, 
417, 418 (Utah 1993) (Justices Durham, Zimmerman, Stewart), that 
reversible error occurred as the result of the trial judge's failure 
to remove a juror challenged by the defendant for cause. The 
majority determined that Juror Cole's answers indicated an inability 
to sentence the defendant to anything other than death if he were 
convicted of capital murder. Furthermore, the State's attempt to 
rehabilitate Juror Cole failed because (1) "it created a false 
dichotomy between the juror's 'subjective' and 'intellectual' 
feelings regarding the appropriate penalty," (2) "the question as 
posed suggested to Cole that the State was asking what he as a juror 
would do if the court had concluded that the sentence 'should not be 
the death penalty,'" and (3) "'[a] statement made by a prospective 
juror that he intends to be fair and impartial loses its meaning in 
light of other testimony or facts that suggest a bias.'" Id. at 396 
quoting State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26 (Utah 1984), and comparing 
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2233, 119 L.Ed.2d 
492 (1992). 
A comparison of the entire voir dire of Juror Cole with the 
entire voir dire of the jurors at issue in the instant case 
demonstrates that the challenged jurors in the present case 
evidenced similar or stronger bias than Juror Cole and were not 
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adequately rehabilitated.4 See Addendum A to this brief containing 
transcript of entire voir dire of Juror Cole in Young; Addendum C to 
Appellant's opening brief containing transcript of entire voir dire 
of jurors challenged in the present case. 
The proper focus for this Court in assessing whether 
Judge Uno erred in failing to grant a challenge for cause is whether 
the voir dire of a specific juror, when viewed as a whole, 
demonstrates that the "juror's views about capital punishment would 
prevent or substantially impair him or her" from acting impartially 
or otherwise indicate that the juror would automatically vote for 
the death penalty if the defendant were convicted of first degree 
murder. 
Although the State argues in its brief that no error 
occurred, it recognizes that Mr. Menzies' challenge to potential 
jurors presents a close question. State's brief at 125. A review 
of the voir dire of the challenged jurors demonstrates that 
Judge Uno committed reversible error in failing to remove them for 
cause. While Mr. Menzies relies on his opening brief at 33-8 
discussing the majority of the challenged jurors, he replies 
directly to the State's argument regarding Juror Cannon as follows. 
4. The State's criticism that the voir dire was "muddied" by 
open-ended questions about the death penalty without first outlining 
the law has little impact in assessing whether the challenged jurors 
should have been removed. The trial judge in the instant case used 
a "script" to question jurors which was agreed to by both the State 
and defendant. This "script" was used to ensure that the same 
questions were asked of each juror and that all necessary questions 
were covered. Many jurors survived this process without giving 
answers which indicated an inability to sit as a juror in a capital 
case. A trial judge's inartful questioning should not work against 
the defendant. Nor does the use of leading questions require that 
this Court disregard a juror's response. Jurors (and witnesses) 
often respond negatively to leading questions. 
- 7 -
A. JUROR CANNON 
Like Juror Cole in Young, Juror Cannon indicated "a clear 
view that if defendant was convicted of a murder that was at all 
aggravated, death was the only appropriate penalty." Young, 853 
P.2d at 417. Juror Cannon stated at least five times that she would 
vote for death if a defendant were convicted of murder. T. 350, 
352, 353, 357. She explicitly stated at least twice that if the 
jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, she could not vote 
for life. R. 350, 353, 357. 
JUDGE UNO: If the jury should convict 
Mr. Menzies of first degree murder, would you be 
able to consider voting for a sentence less than 
death? 
JUROR CANNON: I don't think so. 
T. 353. 
Defense counsel later questioned the juror on this issue, 
and the juror indicated that she would impose a death sentence on 
someone who had committed a first degree murder. T. 357; colloquoy 
quoted in Appellant's opening brief at 33. 
Juror Cannon continued to answer that she would always vote 
for death (T. 350, 353, 357), even after the judge informed her that 
aggravating factors must outweigh mitigating factors (T. 352) and 
asked her whether she was willing to think about mitigating 
evidence. T. 355. These continued responses emphasize the strength 
of her conviction. 
As was the case with Juror Cole in Young, Juror Cannon was 
not adequately rehabilitated. The judge asked an inartful question 
regarding the juror's ability to consider mitigating evidence; 
before receiving an answer, he then stated, ff[i]f this goes into a 
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second phase, you know, the penalty phase, the punishment phase," 
T. 355. Juror Cannon then responded, "Yes." 
This exchange between the judge and juror fails to 
demonstrate that the juror was willing to consider mitigating 
evidence and impose life for several reasons: (1) The judge did not 
ask a question at the end of his statements; the juror may have been 
responding "yes, she understood there were two phases" or "yes, she 
understood that in certain circumstances the judge told the jury to 
'recommend' a life sentence"; the ambiguous nature of the judge's 
statements and the juror's limited response leaves a question as to 
whether the juror understood the penalty phase procedure or 
indicated that she would consider mitigating evidence if the 
defendant were convicted; (2) as was the case in Young, the judge's 
statement that consideration of mitigating evidence "would mean 
recommending a life sentence" incorrectly suggests that the trial 
judge might indicate his view of the proper sentence, (3) the 
judge's statement that where the jury considers mitigating evidence, 
"that would then mean recommending a life sentence" misstates the 
law in that it suggests that in some circumstances the jury merely 
recommends a life sentence rather than determines that sentence,5 
(4) Juror Cannon continued to indicate she would always impose 
death. T. 357. 
Given the repeated and strong response by Juror Cannon that 
she would impose death where a defendant was convicted of first 
degree murder, the ambiguous exchange does not clarify or establish 
5. The trial judge referred to the "recommendations" of the jury 
regarding sentence at other times when questioning this juror. 
T. 359. 
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that she would set aside those convictions, consider mitigating 
evidence and impose life. 
T. 359, also cited by the state in support of its argument 
that Juror Cannon was not an automatic death penalty (ADP) juror, 
contains the following ambiguous exchange: 
THE COURT: After weighing both of those factors, 
you have a reasonable—the State has to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt the aggravating 
circumstances, the unfavorable factors. Do you 
understand that? 
A JUROR: No. 
THE COURT: The State has the burden. They have 
to show by the proof, the evidence, the 
aggravating, the unfavorable factors. Do you 
understand that? 
A JUROR: Yes. 
THE COURT: If they failed to do so, then the 
death penalty recommendation would not be made 
because they didn't prove it# and you have to 
consider whether they proved it or not. Do you 
understand that? 
A JUROR: Yes. 
THE COURT: And if they failed to prove it, then 
the recommendation would be for life in prison. 
A JUROR: Yes. 
THE COURT: Can you consider those factors? 
A JUROR: Yes. 
THE COURT: Would you consider those factors? 
A JUROR: Yes. 
T. 359 (emphasis added)• 
This exchange also fails to rehabilitate the juror because 
the judge failed to adequately or correctly state the law. The 
trial judge failed to mention mitigating evidence, instead pointing 
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out that the State had the burden of proving aggravating factors. 
The juror's yes response that she could "consider those factors" 
refers to aggravating evidence, not mitigating factors. In 
addition, the judge continued to refer to the jury sentencing as a 
"recommendation." The juror's responses during this ambiguous 
exchange fail to cleanse her earlier strong statements that she 
would impose death. 
The State also claims that the following exchange 
demonstrates that the juror was rehabilitated. 
MR. JONES: Just one other question. 
Mrs. Cannon, I take it from your statements here 
today you don't think the death penalty is 
appropriate in every single murder case. 
JUROR CANNON: Not every single one. 
R. 359. 
The State acknowledges that this response "may seem 
grudging." State's brief at 37. More importantly, it fails to 
address the concerns raised by Juror Cannon's dual responses that 
she would impose only death where a defendant was convicted of a 
first degree murder. T. 353, 357. The prosecutor's question dealt 
only with the generic term "murder." Murder encompasses a number of 
circumstances where the death penalty is not a possible sentence, 
e.g. a homicide caused by a drunk driver. The fact that 
Juror Cannon would not impose death on all murderers fails to alter 
her previous answers that she would consider only death for first 
degree murders. 
In addition, even if the prosecutor had asked only about 
first degree murders and received this response, the prior bias 
would not be erased given the strength and repetition of her prior 
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statements despite attempts by the trial judge to clarify the role 
of jurors in the penalty phase. This response, following the 
voir dire at issue, is comparable to a statement by the juror that 
she "intends to be fair and impartial" and "loses its meaning in 
light of other testimony or facts that suggest a bias." See Young, 
853 P.2d at 396. 
Juror Cannon's response as a whole demonstrates that she 
was an automatic death penalty juror. Her responses were not 
adequately rehabilitated, and Judge Uno therefore committed 
reversible error in refusing to remove her for cause. 
B. REVERSIBLE ERROR OCCURS WHERE A CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANT IS REQUIRED TO USE A PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGE TO REMOVE A JUROR WHO SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
REMOVED FOR CAUSE. 
This Court has repeatedly held that reversible error occurs 
where a party is required to use a peremptory challenge to remove a 
juror who should have been removed for cause. State v. Gotschall, 
782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 
1989); Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975); 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 451 (Utah 1988); Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 
25; State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 883 (Utah 1981); Jenkins v. 
Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981); State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 
799, 802-03 (Utah 1977); State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah 
1980). 
The entire Court recently reaffirmed this proposition in 
State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 343, 395-6 (Utah 1993).6 Young is 
6. Although Justices Hall and Howe did not believe error occurred 
in failing to remove Juror Cole, they acknowledged "[d]efendant 
correctly asserts that prejudicial error would have occurred if he 
(continued) 
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recent authority from this Court which maintains the long-standing 
Utah rule and holds that reversible error occurred in precisely the 
same context as is claimed in the instant case. 
The Utah rule is based on Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah constitution. See, 
e.g.. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1987); Hewitt, 689 
P.2d at 25; Bailey, 605 P.2d at 767-8. In a criminal case, the 
number of peremptory challenges is mandated by Rule 18(d), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Requiring a defendant to use one of 
the peremptory challenges mandated by the rule violates a 
substantial right. See Brooks, 563 P.2d at 802; State v. Moore, 562 
P.2d 629, 631 (Utah 1977) (failure of trial judge to excuse juror 
for cause "deprived defendant of one of his statutory peremptory 
challenges").7 
The State asks this Court to overrule its long-standing 
rule in light of the five-year-old United States Supreme Court 
decision in Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 
L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). This is not a new request by the State. Indeed, 
in its brief in Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, the State cited Ross and 
asked this Court to reevaluate the reversible error rule in light of 
Ross. In response, this Court reaffirmed the well established Utah 
(Footnote 6 continued) 
were required to use his peremptory challenges on jurors who should 
have been removed for cause." Young, 853 P.2d at 343. A majority 
held that reversible error occurred. Id. at 395-6, 417, 418. 
7. In a capital case, the protections of Article I, Section 10 of 
the Utah constitution also come into play. As recognized by 
Justice Durham in her opinion in Young, 853 P.2d at 394, Article I, 
Section 10 further emphasizes or "reinforces" the right to trial by 
an impartial jury in capital cases. 
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rule without mentioning Ross, Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 462.8 
In response to a similar request made by the State to the 
Court of Appeals in State v. Woolley, the Court of Appeals stated: 
The Utah Supreme Court was faced with this 
precise issue in 1989 in Gotschall and Julian 
after Ross was decided. We assume that the Court 
considered Ross when deciding Gotschall and 
Julian, but chose to stay with its long-standing 
rule that "[a] court commits prejudicial error if 
it forces a party to exercise a peremptory 
challenge to remove a prospective juror who 
should have been removed for cause.11 Gotschall, 
782 P. at 461; see also Julian, 771 P.2d at 1046 
n.ll. Accordingly, we assume this is still the 
law in Utah. 
State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, 443 n.5 (Utah App. 1991). Hence, 
although this Court has not explicitly mentioned Ross in its 
decisions, it appears that it has determined that Ross has no impact 
on Utah law. 
In Ross, the high Court determined that an Oklahoma law 
which required a defendant to use his peremptory challenges to cure 
erroneous denials of challenges for cause did not violate the 
defendant's rights to an impartial jury and due process under the 
sixth and fourteenth amendments. Pursuant to "a long settled 
principle of Oklahoma law," reversible error occurred in that state 
only where a defendant used all his peremptory challenges and a 
juror who should have been removed for cause actually sat on the 
jury. While the Court held that this law did not violate the sixth 
and fourteenth amendments, it pointed out that it 
8. This Court also denied the State's petitions for writ of 
certiorari in two cases, State v. Woolley, 810 P.2d 440, and 
State v. Kavmark, 829 P.2d 860 (Utah App. 1992), in which the State 
asked this Court to reevaluate the reversible error rule in light of 
Ross. 
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need not decide the broader question of whether, 
in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the 
"right" to exercise peremptory challenges, "a 
denial or impairment" of the exercise of 
peremptory challenges occurs if the defendant 
uses one or more challenges to remove jurors who 
should have been removed for cause. [citations 
omitted] 
Ross, 487 U.S. at 91, 108 S.Ct 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d at 92. 
This "broader question" would be presented if this Court 
were to consider the State's request since Utah does not have a law 
similar to the Oklahoma law requiring the use of peremptory 
challenges to remove jurors who should have been removed for cause. 
Indeed, the well established Utah rule is that a new trial is 
required where a criminal defendant is forced to used a peremptory 
challenge to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause.9 
A number of jurisdictions follow the Utah rule in requiring 
a new trial when a criminal defendant is forced to use a peremptory 
challenge to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause. 
See cites in State's brief at 49. In Wasko v. Frankel, 569 P.2d 
230, 232 (Ariz. 1977), the Arizona Supreme Court relied on this 
Court's decision in Crawford v. Manning, 542 P.2d 1091, in 
determining that the use of a peremptory challenge to remove a juror 
9. Although a majority determined that the Oklahoma law did not 
violate the right to trial by an impartial jury, four members of the 
Ross Court strongly dissented. This Court is free to interpret 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah constitution differently than the 
majority in Ross interpreted the federal constitution. The dissent 
in Ross provides strong support for such a distinct analysis. Given 
the long-standing rule in Utah, such a distinct analysis is not 
necessary unless this Court were to overrule its long line of cases 
following that rule. In the unlikely event that this Court were to 
consider such a step, Appellant respectfully requests that it hold 
that the Utah constitutional right to an impartial jury is violated 
by forcing a defendant to use a peremptory challenge to remove a 
juror who should have been removed for cause based on the analysis 
in the dissent in Ross. 
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who should have been removed for cause is reversible error. 
Although the State contends that there was no "discussion or serious 
analysis" in Crawford (State's brief at 45), the Arizona Supreme 
Court was sufficiently impressed by the opinion to quote two 
paragraphs of the language in its own opinion. Wasko v. Frankelf 
569 P.2d at 232. 
Interestingly, the Arizona Supreme Court, which patterned 
its rule after the Utah rule, has been faced with a Ross challenge 
similar to the one raised by the State in this case. In a thorough 
and well reasoned decision, the Arizona court reaffirmed the 
reversal rule in Wasko and rejected the State's request that in 
light of Ross v. Oklahoma, the defendant be required to show 
prejudice. State v. Huertaf 855 P.2d 776 (Ariz. 1993). The Huerta 
court traced the history of the reversal rule in Arizona, which "is 
not without some inconsistency." Jd. at 777. It noted that Ross 
did not control its decision and focused instead on the importance 
of stare decisis and the substantial rights vindicated by the rule. 
The court traced the history of the peremptory challenge, pointing 
out that it has M/very old credentials/lf and is "'one of the most 
important of rights secured to the accused.'" Id. at 779, quoting 
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (overruled Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79 (1986)), and Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 89. 
The Arizona court also recognized that "adoption of such a 
harmless error test would inevitably lead to bizarre results" and 
create a "Hobson's choice" for a defendant faced with a juror who 
should be stricken for cause. See also State v. Sexton, 787 P.2d 
1097 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (distinguishing Oklahoma rule in Ross 
- 16 -
from Arizona rule) . 
Various other courts have expressly rejected a Ross 
challenge to the state rule requiring reversal where a peremptory 
challenge is used to remove a juror who should have been removed for 
cause. See People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234, 244 fn.12 (Colo. 
1992); State v. Wacaserf 794 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. 1990)10; State v. 
Bennett, 382 S.E.2d 322 (W.Va. 1989). 
The State has not argued that the majority of the states 
with a rule similar to that of Utah, have rejected that rule in 
light of Ross.11 Indeed, courts in states with a rule similar to 
that in Utah which have been presented with a Ross challenge appear 
to have for the most part rejected that challenge. See Huerta, 855 
P.2d 776; Sexton, 828 P.2d 234 (Colo. 1992); Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d 
190; Bennett, 382 S.E.2d 322. 
As the Huerta court concluded: 
Requiring a party to show separate prejudice when 
a trial judge erroneously fails to remove a 
biased juror would effectively eviscerate the 
right to peremptory challenges []. The prejudice 
of having one less peremptory challenge than the 
other side is enough to mandate reversal. 
10. In Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d at 193, the court recognized that 
adopting the state's analysis "would severely dilute the value of 
peremptory challenges" and questioned the state's claim that the 
Ross rule was embraced by a majority of jurisdictions. 
11. The State incorrectly relies on at least two cases for the 
proposition that "[a] majority of states follow the Ross approach or 
otherwise require an aggrieved party to affirmatively demonstrate 
prejudice." See Commonwealth v. Susi# 477 N.E.2d 995 (Mass. 1985) 
("The erroneous denial of the right to exercise a proper peremptory 
challenge is reversible error without a showing of prejudice."); 
State v. Santelli, 621 A.2d 222# 224 (Vt. 1992) ("reversible error 
to 'force a defendant to use his last peremptory to exclude a juror 
challengeable for cause' where the defendant indicates his desire to 
peremptorily challenge another juror"). These two jurisdictions 
actually follow a rule similar to that in Utah. 
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Huerta, 776 P.2d at 781. 
This Court should continue to follow the longstanding Utah 
rule that use of a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should 
have been removed for cause requires a new trial. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANTS MOTION FOR MISTRIAL 
AFTER THE STATE FAILED TO DISCLOSE THE 
POST-LINEUP QUERY OF ITS KEY WITNESS. 
A. THIS ISSUE WAS PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR REVIEW.12 
The State initially argues that Appellant waived this 
argument because he did not move to continue rather than asking for 
a mistrial.13 State's brief at 52-3. Contrary to the State's 
argument, this Court's decision in State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232 
(Utah 1993), provides recent, strong authority that a motion for 
mistrial properly preserves a discovery issue for appellate review 
after a witness offers surprise testimony which has not been 
conveyed to the defense. In Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1242, this Court 
reviewed on the merits a discovery violation by the State where the 
12. This Court should review all issues on their merits in this 
case. See "waiver" discussion supra at 1-2. 
13. Although the State seems to be arguing that defendant should 
have made a motion to continue rather than a motion for mistrial, 
its heading in Point 3a, State's brief at 52, suggests that the 
State also thinks the motion was "untimely." Defense counsel 
initially moved to strike the testimony. She also asked the trial 
judge "to take whatever measures are appropriate to determine that 
there is not additional information that has not been provided to 
us." T. 1297. She then made a motion for mistrial within ten 
transcript pages of the judge's ruling striking the testimony and 
admonishing the jury. T. 1299, 1304, 1313-4. The prosecutor 
responded and the judge ruled on the merits. Under such 
circumstances, defense counsel's motion was timely; even if the 
motion for mistrial were not timely, the trial judge's ruling on the 
merits preserved it for appellate review. See State v. Belqardf 830 
P.2d 264 (Utah 1992); State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 
1991) (Johnson I). 
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defendant made a motion for mistrial after the State had failed to 
inform defense counsel that a witness would testify to incriminating 
evidence that she had not previously mentioned and which had not 
been conveyed to defense counsel. In Archuleta, as in the present 
case, defense counsel learned of the discovery violation by the 
State as the witness testified before the jury. 
While the State did not cite Archuleta on this point in its 
brief, it cited other cases which it claims require that a defendant 
move for a continuance in order to preserve a discovery issue. 
However, those cases are distinguishable in that the defense learned 
of the discovery violation before the evidence was presented to the 
jury; unlike the cases relied on by the State, a motion to continue 
would not have remedied the situation in this case where defense 
counsel learned of the violation during the course of trial. See 
State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 882-3 (Utah 1988) (no reversal 
where defense counsel learned of discovery violation prior to trial 
and made no "efforts to mitigate or eliminate the prejudice caused 
by the prosecutor's conduct"); State v. Larson, 773 P.2d 415 (Utah 
1989) (no reversal where defendant learned of discovery violation 
before trial and did not move for continuance despite trial judge's 
indication that he would consider such a motion); State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987) (reversal where defense counsel 
learned of discovery violation before trial and moved to continue). 
This Court has never held that a motion to continue is 
required to preserve a discovery issue for appellate review where 
defense counsel learns of the violation as the evidence is presented 
to the jury. Where a continuance will not remedy the harm caused by 
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the violation# such a motion is not required. See Rule 16(g), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure; Long v. State, 431 N.E.2d 875, 877 
(Ind. App. 1982) (continuance not an effective remedy under 
circumstances surrounding discovery violation); United States v. 
Noe, 821 F.2d 604, 607-9 (11th Cir. 1987) (accord); Stevens v. 
State, 582 P.2d 621, 624-5 (Alaska 1978) (continuance not an 
effective remedy where defense counsel learned of undisclosed police 
report after it had been used to defendant's detriment at trial). 
Indeed, the rule envisions that the trial judge will select from 
alternative remedies in order "to tailor the remedy to alleviate 
harm to the defense from the failure to disclose." See State v, 
Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Mo. banc 1992) (holding that 
discovery violation was reversible error in capital case). 
Although defense counsel asked during cross-examination 
whether Tim had indicated any hesitation in his lineup selection, 
she did not know about the post-lineup discussion with the 
prosecutor when she asked the question. As she pointed out and the 
judge found, she would not have asked the question had she been 
aware of the information. T. 1298, 1300. 
The State elicited information from Tim during redirect 
examination toward the end of Tim's testimony. While it is not 
certain how defense counsel would have used this information had she 
been aware of it, it is certain that she would have questioned Tim 
away from the jury regarding the circumstances surrounding the 
statement and his reasons for asking the question. It is also 
certain that she would have approached the critical issue of whether 
Tim could identify the person at Storm Mountain in a different 
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manner and not conducted her cross-examination as she did. 
A continuance would not have removed the statement from the 
jury's ears; nor would it have allowed defense counsel to approach 
her case in a different manner. The damage was done in this case 
when Tim testified as to the statement, and a continuance would not 
have mitigated the damage done by the prosecutor's violation of the 
discovery rules. 
B. THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
STATE VIOLATED ITS DISCOVERY DUTIES. 
The trial judge concluded that a discovery violation 
occurred in this case. T. 1299, 1300. A review of the record and 
case law supports this conclusion. 
In Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1242-3, this Court held that the 
State violated its duty under Rule 16(a), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. In support of its holding, this Court stated: 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a) imposes a 
duty on the prosecutor to provide discovery 
material to the defense on request. The duty is 
continuous and applies whether the prosecutor is 
responding to a court order or is voluntarily 
producing information. Here, the State 
voluntarily adopted an open file policy and 
provided the defense with copies of Luce's 
interviews with police. However, the State 
knowingly failed to supplement information 
concerning the change in Luce's testimony on the 
eve of trial. Hence, as the trial court 
correctly found, the State violated its duty 
under rule 16(a). 
Id. Although the information in Archuleta was not exculpatory, it 
fell within the State's continuing duty to disclose statements by 
witnesses. 
In the present case, the State did not acknowledge this 
Court's decision in Archuleta or attempt to distinguish the holding 
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of Archuleta that the State had violated its discovery duty under 
the rule. Instead, the State relied on Knight, 734 P.2d 913, in 
support of its argument that the State did not violate Rule 16 in 
this case. See State's brief at 54. 
In Knight, 734 P.2d at 917, this Court stated: 
For the misleading-the-defense rationale to 
apply, the discovery request must be sufficiently 
specific to permit the prosecution to understand 
what is sought and to justify the parallel 
assumption on the part of the defense that 
material not produced does not exist. 
A review of the record in this case establishes that the 
State's claim on appeal that the discovery request was not 
sufficiently specific to cover this material is not supported by the 
record. In Appellant's motion for discovery, a copy of which is 
contained in Addendum B, Appellant requested "[a]11 police reports 
and investigations concerning the above-entitled case."14 The 
record also reveals that the prosecutor understood this to include 
statements of witnesses and responded in part to the request. 
In response to Defendant's motion to strike based on the 
discovery violation, the prosecutor initially claimed that "the 
request for discovery has to do with evidence which is of an 
exculpatory nature." T. 1297. 
Defense counsel responded: 
MS. WELLS: . . . the discovery orders are for not 
just exculpatory information. They are for 
reports and statements of witnesses. Now, I have 
received numerous statements of Mr. Larabee which 
the court has seen me utilize to cross-examine. 
14. Defendant also filed a "Motion to Require the State of Utah to 
Disclose Potential Penalty Phase Witnesses." R. 772. In that 
motion, defendant indicated that the State had already provided him 
with a list of guilt/innocence phase witnesses. R. 773. 
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T. 1298 (emphasis added). The trial judge then granted the defense 
motion, implicitly finding that the State had provided previous 
statements by Larabee to the defense. T. 1299. 
The prosecutor interrupted the trial judge's ruling, 
stating: 
MR. JONES: Where—excuse me. Where in the 
discovery order does it require us to—it simply 
says we have to turn over the statements we 
have. Just because a witness tells us 
afterwards, the defense has access to these 
witnesses• 
T. 1299 (emphasis added). The prosecutor's own statement indicates 
that he understood the discovery motion to cover statements by 
witnesses. His claim seems to be, however, that once he had turned 
over the statements, he did not have a continuing duty to inform 
defense counsel "when a witness tells us afterwards." This is 
incorrect. See Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1242-3 (holding that Rule 16 
violated under similar circumstances where prosecutor failed to give 
new information from witness to defense). 
Both parties understood the discovery request to include 
statements of witnesses. The State supplied defense counsel with 
statements from witnesses, including statements from Tim Larabee. 
The trial judge implicitly found that statements from Larabee were 
included in determining that a discovery violation had occurred. 
Furthermore, the prosecutor had previously provided statements by 
Tim to defense counsel and therefore had a continuing obligation to 
inform defense counsel that this important exchange had occurred. 
C. THE DISCOVERY VIOLATION REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
In Archuleta, this Court recognized that pursuant to 
Rule 16(g), "the trial court 'has ample power to obviate any 
- 23 -
prejudice resulting from a breach of the criminal discovery rules' 
and may fashion any remedy as it sees fit so long as the substantial 
rights of the defendant are not violated." Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 
1243, quoting Knight, 734 P.2d at 918. 
This Court articulated the following standard for reversal 
where the State has violated its duty of discovery: 
[A]n error based on nondisclosure by the 
prosecution warrants reversal "/only if a review 
of the record persuades the court that without 
the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result for the defendant.'" A 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result 
arises when the error has so eroded a reviewing 
court's confidence in the outcome of a particular 
trial that the court believes a new trial is 
necessary. Moreover, when the state violates its 
duty to disclose information, it bears the burden 
on appeal of persuading the court that the error 
did not unfairly prejudice the defendant. 
Id. at 1243 (emphasis in the original) (citations and footnotes 
omitted). 
Although this Court found the discovery violation to be 
harmless in Archuleta, the instant case differs from Archuleta in 
that the undisclosed evidence in this case goes to the heart of the 
State's case—whether or not Appellant was the man Tim Larabee saw 
at Storm Mountain. In addition to being more important to the case, 
the violation was more egregious in the instant case due to the fact 
that the statement was made directly to the prosecutor, he was aware 
of it for over a year before trial, and it weakened the exculpatory 
effect of other evidence which had been conveyed to the defense. 
See Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d at 507-8 (failure to inform the defense 
that it was calling a police officer was reversible error in capital 
case); see also Elledge v. State, 613 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 1993) 
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(failure to provide defense counsel with prison reports is 
reversible error in penalty phase)• 
In its analysis of the reversibility issue, the State loses 
sight of the fact that it has the burden of persuading this Court 
that the error did not unfairly prejudice defendant. See State's 
brief at 58-9. The trial judge correctly found that a discovery 
violation occurred; the State has the burden on appeal where it 
violates its duty to disclose information. Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 
1243. 
The State cannot sustain its burden. It needed Tim to 
directly connect Appellant to the homicide, but Larabee did not 
identify Menzies in court and picked someone else out of a lineup. 
This disputed piece of evidence had the impact of suggesting to the 
jury that Larabee saw Menzies at Storm Mountain. Had defense 
counsel been aware of the evidence, she would have prepared her case 
to preclude its admission or undermine its impact. 
The trial judge recognized the importance of the evidence 
and the impact that knowledge of the evidence would have had on 
defense counsel's approach to the case. T. 1300, 1301, 1302. 
The confusing admonishment given by the trial judge did not 
cure the error in this case. It suggested that all of the evidence, 
including the evidence that Tim selected someone else, could be 
disregarded. Although defense counsel attempted to clarify, her 
statements were, of course, not instructions from the judge. The 
judge then attempted to restate the admonishment but never directly 
told the jury that they were to disregard the testimony regarding a 
post-lineup query. T. 1304. 
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In addition, the admonishment did nothing to change the 
nature of the cross-examination conducted by defense counsel. As 
the judge recognized and as is obvious, defense counsel would have 
approached her case differently had she been aware of this 
information. She had many ways to undermine Tim's query. Full 
investigation of this query would have led either to its suppression 
or thorough cross-examination on the circumstances which led to 
Tim's asking the question. See generally United States v. Noe, 821 
F.2d at 608 (recognizing that "trial by ambush" would be encouraged 
if court decided reversibility issue based on strength of remaining 
evidence). 
POINT IV. NONDISCLOSURE OF THE DETAILS OF THE 
PHOTO ARRAY PREJUDICED DEFENDANT. 
Where defense counsel learns of the discovery violation 
when the State presents the evidence to the jury, a continuance 
would not mitigate the harm, and a motion for continuance is not 
necessary to preserve the discovery issue for appellate review. See 
discussion supra at 18-21. 
Although the State makes a halfhearted attempt to question 
whether evidence that Larabee was unable to initially make a photo 
selection was exculpatory, it is apparent that this evidence 
undermines the impact of Tim's ultimate uncertain selection of a 
photo. See Norris v. Slayton, 540 F.2d 1241, 1243 (4th Cir. 1976). 
Although Tim admitted that he did not make a positive photo 
selection, a selection where the person is not positive is stronger 
than a selection where the person is not positive and was not able 
to initially make any selection at all. The failure to make a 
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selection initially and the delay in making a selection until after 
Tim went with the officer to the parking lot and looked at cars is 
separate and additional exculpatory evidence which should have been 
conveyed to defense counsel. 
The State has the burden of persuading this Court on appeal 
that Appellant was not prejudiced by this nondisclosure. Archuleta, 
850 P.2d at 1243. Larabee's testimony regarding the man he saw at 
Storm Mountain was critical to the State's case. This information 
regarding his initial inability to make a selection from the photo 
array weakened Tim's ultimate selection. Failure to disclose this 
information to defense counsel prior to trial requires a new trial. 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN ALLOWING THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
TESTIMONY OF WALTER BRITTON TO BE READ TO THE 
JURY. 
A. ADMISSION OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
TRANSCRIPT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION. 
The essence of the confrontation right is the 
opportunity to have the accusing witness in court 
and subject to cross-examination, so that bias 
and credibility can be evaluated by the finder of 
fact. 
State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1356 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added). 
The initial consideration in determining whether a confrontation 
violation occurred is whether the witness appeared before the trier 
of fact, and not whether the witness appeared in court at some 
point. See State v. Sealey 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 16 (Utah 1993); 
Nelson, 75 P.2d at 1356. 
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The State misapprehends the confrontation protection when 
it argues that "the confrontation clause is not implicated here" 
because "Walter Britton was 'physically present and subject to 
cross-examination' at trial." State's brief at 67. Walter Britton 
never appeared before the jury, which was the trier of fact in this 
case. Britton appeared before the judge, who held a special 
hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine whether 
Britton was unavailable. R. 957, 968. The jury did not have the 
opportunity to review Britton or assess his bias or credibility in 
this case.15 R. 957, 968. Hence, the confrontation clause is 
implicated in this case.16 
The State confuses the cases cited at 64-67 when it 
suggests that they stand for the proposition that the witness be 
present during the course of trial. Instead, those cases require 
presence before the trier of fact or a finding of unavailability. 
Cases such as Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), and 
15. Although the State asserts that defense counsel "chose to" 
examine Britton "outside the presence of the jury" (State's brief 
at 67), this assertion is not supported by the record. The 
transcript pages cited by the State for this proposition are 
defense counsel's cross-examination of Britton before the judge on 
the availability issue. See R. 1074-81. The record reflects a 
discussion about a "preliminary matter" which was to take place 
outside the presence of the jury. R. 956. Britton then testified 
regarding whether he would testify before the jury. R. 957. The 
whole purpose of this hearing outside the presence of the jury was 
for the trial judge to determine whether Britton was available and 
could testify before the jury. R. 961. Defense counsel wanted 
Britton to appear before the jury and argued strenuously and 
repeatedly that he was not unavailable. T. 1068-9, 1090, 1091, 
1094, 1105-1107, 1121. 
16. The State filed its motion approximately ten days before trial 
started. R. 1094. The fact that this hearing took place during 
the course of the trial does not mean that the confrontation clause 
was satisfied. 
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Seale, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, where the witness had little memory 
of events, address the issue of whether the memory loss is so 
severe that the defendant is deprived of his right to cross-examine 
about extrinsic statements. See Seale, 207 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. 
They do not stand for the proposition that a witness' appearance 
before the trial judge during the course of a jury trial satisfies 
the confrontation clause. 
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 809, involved a circumstance 
where the judge conducted a "voir dire examination" of the 
three-year-old witness, apparently outside the presence of the 
jury, and determined that she was "not capable of communicating to 
the jury." The Court held that the confrontation clause was 
violated by the admission of out-of-court statements by the witness 
to an examining doctor. Contrary to the State's suggestion that 
Idaho v. Wright is "a retreat from the general rule that a 
witness's physical presence satisfies the confrontation clause" and 
"[a]ny exception arguably carved out by Wright would be limited to 
young children" (State's brief at 64-5 fn.22), Wright is solid 
confrontation clause analysis. 
1. Britton Was Not Unavailable. 
Rather than addressing the unavailability issue on its 
merits, the State incorrectly claims that defense counsel conceded 
Britton was unavailable. State's brief at 67 fn.24. A review of 
the entire record in this case demonstrates that no such concession 
occurred. 
The State bases its concession claim on the following 
statement attributed to defense counsel: 
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MS. WELLS: That's what I wanted the record to 
state, is that as a result of his testimony 
today? They are asking the court to declare him 
unavailable, I assume, and to allow him to use 
the preliminary hearing testimony? 
Based upon my understanding of the rule, he 
technically at this point would become 
unavailable for purposes of the rule. However, 
the question to be raised now is whether or not 
the court will allow the use of his preliminary 
hearing testimony. 
T. 961. 
This statement was made before defense counsel 
cross-examined Britton on the availability issue.17 T. 957-60, 
961. The further proceedings on this issue make it abundantly clear 
that defense counsel was arguing that Britton was not unavailable. 
T. 1068-9, 1090-94, 1105-1107, 1121, 1125-6. Her cross-examination 
on that issue and further argument that he was available would have 
been unnecessary had she conceded the issue at that point. 
The day after this statement was made, defense counsel 
cross-examined Britton before the judge as to whether he would 
testify. T. 1073-82. Defense counsel then argued that Britton 
should not be excused and returned to federal prison (T. 1090-91) 
and that Britton was not unavailable (T. 1105-7). Indeed, about 160 
transcript pages after the statement which the State claims concedes 
the availability issue, defense counsel explicitly stated that the 
defense was "not conceding unavailability." T. 1121. 
The trial judge understood that the question of whether 
Britton was unavailable was at issue, and ruled on that issue. 
17. This may well be an example of error by the court reporter in 
transcribing the proceedings. See Point I, Appellant's opening 
brief. 
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T. 1125. 
The State's claim that it made a good faith effort to 
obtain Britton's presence in the trial court during the proceedings 
and was not required to make a good faith effort to procure his 
testimony misreads the confrontation cause requirements. This 
Court's statement in State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 
1982), that the State must make "a good faith effort to obtain [the 
witness'] presence before the trier of fact," not in an ancillary 
hearing. See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 75-6 (1980); 
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). 
The State has the burden of establishing unavailability; in 
order to meet that burden in the context of a refusal to testify, it 
must show that it made a good faith effort to present the testimony 
to the trier of fact. See State v. Barelay 779 P.2d 1140, 1142 
(Utah App. 1989). The State offers no authority for its claim that 
once Britton appeared before the trial judge, the burden shifted to 
Appellant (State's brief at 69), and there appears to be no 
authority for this proposition since the State has the burden of 
establishing unavailability.18 
18. The suggestion in the State's brief at 63 fn.20 that defense 
counsel refused to take the State up on its offer to assist defense 
counsel in bringing Britton back takes the statements out of 
context. As part of argument regarding the Rule 35 motion after the 
trial judge had found Britton unavailable and sent him back over 
defendant's objection, the prosecutor indicated that he knew how to 
do the paperwork for bringing out-of-state witnesses to Utah, the 
State was obligated to pay for such witnesses for the defense, and 
he would "assist in attempting to retrieve" Britton "if for some 
reason to bring him back." The prosecutor then argued that he did 
not think there was any reason to bring Britton back. T. 1822. 
This is a far cry from a generous offer to assist in the return of 
the witness. 
(continued) 
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As set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 53-57, Britton 
was not unavailable where he was present during the course of the 
proceedings and answered specific questions despite his general 
refusal to testify. Britton did not persist in refusing to answer 
questions and therefore was not unavailable. In addition, the State 
failed to establish that it made a good faith effort to procure 
Britton#s testimony. 
In its brief, the State does not directly address 
Appellant's claims that Britton#s testimony was unreliable due to 
his mental incompetency or defense counsel's inability to 
cross-examine Britton at the preliminary hearing on issues such as 
Britton's mental health or expectation of benefits. See Appellant's 
brief at 60-6. 
The State does point out that defense counsel questioned 
Britton about news reports at the preliminary hearing. T. 2106-8. 
(Footnote 18 continued) 
Defense counsel then argued a number of issues, including 
the trial court's previous ruling that Britton was unavailable. The 
entire argument at this juncture was made in recognition of the fact 
that the trial judge had already ruled that the State could use the 
preliminary hearing transcript instead of Britton. In this context, 
defense counsel stated: 
Ms. Palacios; And we can't confront him on that 
because this occurred after he testified at the 
preliminary hearing. With respect to Mr. Britton 
still being available, he is not. We objected, 
and the court is aware we had strenuous 
objections with respect to Mr. Britton being 
released, and the court allowed him to be 
released. So it's not as though he is still 
available. 
T. 1824. Britton was the State's witness; the State wanted to use 
his preliminary hearing transcript. The judge had found him 
unavailable and determined that the State could use that 
transcript. The suggestion that under these circumstances, the 
defense had some obligation to procure this out-of-state federal 
prisoner in order to exercise defendant's right to confrontation 
under these circumstances does not fit within notions of due process, 
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However, defense counsel appears to have just learned of the news 
reports as Britton testified and did not have an opportunity to 
review those reports and compare them to details of Britton's 
testimony. This is important information in light of the evolution 
of Britton#s statement and his initial references to incorrect 
information which apparently came from news reports. See 
Appellant's opening brief at 62 fn.23. 
The State responds to Appellant's argument that the 
testimony of a jailhouse informant is so inherently unreliable that 
it should not be presented as former testimony by citing a number of 
cases for the proposition that lf[t]he use of jail informants' 
testimony is widely accepted." See State's brief at 68-9 fn.68. 
None of these cases address the use of preliminary hearing 
testimony of an informant. See, e.g., Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 
436 (1986); People v. Payton, 839 P.2d 1035 (Cal. 1992); State v. 
Rhoades, 820 P.2d 665, 674 (Id. 1991). 
Britton's testimony was so inherently unreliable that the 
trial judge should not have permitted the error to be compounded by 
the use of his former testimony where Appellant had no opportunity 
to cross-examine Britton in front of the jury. Because the jury did 
not have the opportunity to view Britton on the stand, they were 
unable to make the credibility assessment which is critical to this 
type of testimony. See Rhoades, 820 P.2d at 674 ("jury's 
responsibility to weigh the credibility of [jailhouse informant's] 
testimony"). 
POINT XVII. THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN ADMITTING AND RELYING ON THE CONTENTS OF 
APPELLANT'S PRISON FILE. 
- 33 -
A. THE LACK OF RELIABILITY OF THE CONTENTS OF 
THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED THE HEARSAY RULE, DUE 
PROCESS, AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT RELIABILITY 
REQUIREMENT. 
While the State is correct that State v. Lipskey, 608 P.2d 
1241, 1244 (Utah 1980), and State v. Sanwickf 713 P.2d 707, 709 
(Utah 1986), permit the use of hearsay evidence during sentencing 
for a noncapital crime, neither case involves a death sentence and 
therefore the cases do not directly address the argument raised by 
Appellant that the need for reliability in death cases requires that 
hearsay evidence be inadmissible. Appellant's claim is that the 
sentencing phase in a capital case is distinct from sentencing 
proceedings for other crimes; due process and the eighth amendment 
require reliability in sentencing and preclude the admission of the 
unreliable hearsay evidence contained in the prison file. 
In addition, Appellant claims that the double and triple 
hearsay materials in the file were so unreliable that their 
admission violated federal due process. In State v. Mills Johnson# 
218 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993) (Johnson II), this Court held that 
a report prepared by ISAT was inadmissible during sentencing in a 
noncapital case because it did "not rise to minimum standards of 
reliability" which are required in a sentencing hearing. 
Johnson IIf 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7. 
Although hearsay evidence can be admissible in a 
sentencing proceeding, double hearsay is so 
inherently unreliable and presents such a high 
probability for inaccuracy that it cannot stand 
alone as the basis for sentencing. In State v. 
Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 270 (Utah 1980), a 
defendant's death sentence was set aside 
partially because a prosecutor had been allowed 
to testify in the penalty phase regarding the 
substance of hearsay statements made by a witness 
in another trial. Justice Wilkins observed that 
"[w]hether the testimony of Watson was accurate 
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or not, it was hearsay on admissible hearsay" and 
because of its lack of probative value, it should 
not have been admitted in the sentencing phase, 
[citation omitted] 
Johnson II, Utah Adv. Rep. at 6. 
In reaching its unanimous decision in Johnson II# this 
Court reiterated that although "[d]ue process does not impose the 
full range of trial procedure designed to sift truth from error in 
sentencing proceedings [citation omitted]," it nevertheless requires 
that evidence relied on for sentencing be relevant and reliable. 
Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6. This Court recognized that 
"[t]he need for evidentiary reliability in sentencing proceedings is 
greater when specific factual issues must be resolved." See also 
United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 663 (3rd Cir. 1993) 
(recognizing although the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply in 
noncapital sentencing, evidence must nevertheless meet a "threshold 
requirement for admissibility"). As this Court acknowledged in 
Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held 
that "as a matter of due process, factual matters 
may be considered as a basis for sentence only if 
they have some minimal indicum of reliability 
beyond mere allegation." United States v. 
Bay1in, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir. 1982). 
Evidentiary reliability in sentencing is also 
required by the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, which require that information used 
as a basis for sentencing must have "sufficient 
indicia of reliability to support its probable 
accuracy." United States v. Miele, 989 F.2d 659, 
663 (3d Cir. 1993). 
See also United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(quoted by this Court in Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6-7). 
This Court has recognized an even greater need for 
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reliability in sentencing in capital cases. See Holland, 111 P.2d 
at 1026-7, citing Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 S.Ct. 
1981, 1986, 100 L.Ed.2d 575 (1988) (quoting Woodson v. 
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 2991, 49 L.Ed.2d 
944 (1976). Hence, the concerns regarding hearsay and double 
hearsay expressed in Johnson II should be even greater in this 
capital case. 
The prison file is replete with unreliable reports 
containing double and triple hearsay. The index to the prison file 
contained in Addendum L to Appellant's opening brief lists the 
various papers in that file. While the number of unreliable reports 
precludes specific discussion of each item, a few items require 
particular attention.19 
The Mollner report (E8:83:1-12) contains double and triple 
hearsay and summary and conclusion by the investigator. Mollner 
referred to both charged and uncharged crimes, various conclusions 
by third persons as to Ralph's mental state, hearsay regarding 
Ralph's family background and allegations of violent threats 
attributed to Ralph, and the investigator's conclusions about future 
conduct by Ralph.20 
19. Failure to discuss a specific item by no means suggests that 
Appellant believes that particular item was admissible. Appellant 
challenges the reliability and admissibility of each and every item 
contained in the prison file, and submits that the need for 
reliability in the penalty phase precludes wholesale admission of a 
prison file made up of unreliable hearsay on hearsay reports. 
20. The Mollner report should not have been admitted for a number 
of reasons. For example, on page 7 of the report, under the heading 
"Clubs or Organizations," the following statement appears, 
"Mr. Menzies readily admits to this investigator that the 
organization that he belongs to is the Salt Lake Branch of the Devil 
(continued) 
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The various psychological evaluations (E8:104, 105, 108, 
109, 110, 143), incident reports (E8:34, 35, 36, 50, 51, 58, 59, 60, 
61, 64, 69-73, 78, 79), "C" notes from unidentified sources (e.g. 
E8:175, 180, 181), 1976 presentence report (E8:83:l-12) and 
disciplinary hearings results all contain unreliable material.21 
(Footnote 20 continued) 
Worshippers and that there are two temples in the Salt Lake City 
area." E8:83:7. There is no evidence that Ralph was a member of a 
satanic cult. Not only is this information unreliable, its 
inclusion violates Appellant's rights under the first and fourteenth 
amendments. See Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1093, 
117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992) (holding that introduction during the penalty 
phase of the defendant's membership in a white supremacy group 
violated the first amendment where the evidence was not relevant to 
the proceedings); Dawson v. State, 608 A.2d 1201 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1992) (on remand, reversing for new penalty phase). The 
psychological reports at E8:108, 109, 110 are also comparable to the 
ISAT report in their unreliability. The Board of Pardons 
Redetermination is equally unreliable and discusses "persistant 
[sic] rumors . . . that Ralph may be involved in problems on 
D-Block." E8:147. The chronological notes lack any reliability; 
the name of the notetaker is not even included. Those notes contain 
allegations of "strongarming and drinking" (E8:169, 170), suggestion 
that Ralph had used "an incidnerary [sic] device" to light a fire 
(E8:172), major violation for unspecified act of violence which 
could be charged as a crime (E8:173), possible "strongarm situation" 
(E8:175), comments on disruptive behavior and allegation of assaults 
on other inmates (E8:179), triple hearsay statement by inmate Y to 
notetaker regarding allegations that Ralph used shank to 
homosexually rape another inmate (E8:180), statements given to 
notetaker about strike involvement or burning of cells (E8:182), 
allegations of conduct threatening security of prison and threats to 
officers (E8:184), discussion of major disciplinary actions 
(E8:188), allegation that Ralph had two shanks (E8:192), incident 
reports alleging escape (E8:195-204), assaults on other prisoners 
(E8:205-6), threats to other inmates (207-8), triple hearsay report 
that Ralph stabbed another inmate after being hired by other inmates 
(222), disciplinary results—found guilty of stabbing inmate based 
on hearsay testimony of confidential informant (223). Defense 
counsel also objected to the inclusion of police reports regarding 
prior crimes in the prison file. T. 3132 -3133. 
21. Although the State attempts to minimize the seriousness of the 
unreliable allegations contained in these various reports, a review 
of the reports demonstrates that the trial judge may well have 
viewed these reports as examples of criminal conduct which supported 
a death sentence. In footnote 43 of the State's brief at 132, the 
(continued) 
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Admission of the prison file violated federal due process 
and the eighth amendment requirements that a death sentence be based 
on reliable information. 
(Footnote 21 continued) 
State suggests that the reports either "contained no implication of 
wrongdoing" by Menzies or were minor incidents. The State's 
characterization of the various reports underscores the need for 
cross-examination and more reliable evidence. 
Although Appellant has no desire to emphasize the possible 
negative assessment of the reports, this Court should be aware that 
the trial judge could have reviewed these reports as demonstrating 
conduct which supported a death sentence. For example, the State 
dismisses the double hearsay report regarding the bomb incident by 
proclaiming that the incident report contains "no implication of 
wrongdoing" on Menzies' part. State's brief at 132 fn.43. While, 
according to the report (E8:34-5), Menzies claimed that he had found 
and accidentally ignited bombs by turning on the light switch, the 
judge may well have not believed that Menzies was innocent in this 
scheme. This is especially true in light of the "contraband" 
incident report filed two days earlier indicating that Menzies had 
unauthorized light bulbs in his possession. E8:36. In addition, 
the report contains double hearsay statements regarding threats 
Menzies allegedly made to other inmates. E8:34. These reports 
contain double and triple hearsay and, standing alone, suggest the 
need for cross-examination and greater reliability in a sentencing 
hearing since the judge may have viewed this report in a less 
generous manner than the State, and concluded, based on double 
hearsay and unreliable evidence, that Menzies was involved in a 
bombing incident at the prison. 
The State also attempts to minimize the incident report at 
E8:50-l by referring to the conduct as "[t]he so-called criminal 
conduct that defendant calls 'interfering with an officer'" and 
pointing out that it merely involved "an angry expression" and 
confrontative tone of voice. State's brief at 132. fn.43. While 
Appellant agrees with the State that even if he had exhibited this 
behavior, it is not the most serious of offense, the trial judge may 
not have so believed after reading the entire incident report. 
The officer who filled out the report, not defendant, 
characterized the incident as "Interfering with an Officer while 
trying to carry out his duty." E8:50. The officer believed that 
Menzies' "actions merited an incident report" because Menzies had 
refused to leave when asked to do so. Even though the officer 
talked with Ralph and believed there was a "failure to communicate 
on both parts," he still felt compelled to file an incident report. 
The judge may have viewed this report negatively despite the State's 
apparent concession on appeal that this incident did not support a 
death sentence. The State's interpretation of this unreliable 
evidence emphasizes the inappropriateness of allowing the judge to 
(continued) 
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B. ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED 
MR. MENZIES' RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION. 
The right to confrontation has been recognized as applying 
to the penalty phase by various courts. See Proffitt v. Wainwrightf 
685 F.2d 1227, 1251 (11th Cir. 1982); Walton v. State, 481 So.2d 
1197, 1200 (Fla. 1986); Moore v. Zant# 885 F.2d 1497, 1511 (11th 
Cir. 1989); Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 488-9 (Miss. 1988); 
Beltran v. Texas, 728 S.W.2d 382, 387 (Tex. Cr. App. 1987); Smith v. 
State, 676 S.W.2d 379, 390-1 (Tex. Cr. App. 1984); Arnett v. 
Ricketts, 665 F.Supp. 1437, 1444 (D. Ariz. 1987) (defendant's right 
to confrontation violated in penalty phase). 
These decisions are based on the recognition that the need 
for reliability in a capital sentencing proceeding, based on due 
process and the eighth amendment, coupled with the fundamental role 
of the right to confrontation in assuring reliability, requires that 
the right to confrontation apply in the penalty phase of a capital 
trial. See Proffitt v. Wainwright, 685 F.2d at 1251. 
(Footnote 21 continued) 
review the unreliable reports. It also emphasizes the need for 
"Lafferty findings" in this case. 
The three "weapons violations" which the State attempts to 
minimize (State's brief at 132 fn.43) were characterized by the 
officers as incidents involving the use of a weapon on the front 
pages of the three incident reports. E8:58, 60, 63. While the 
State may think they are no big deal, the prison takes them 
seriously, as Judge Uno may have in imposing sentence based on this 
unreliable information. 
In footnote 44 on page 132 of the State's brief, the State 
again suggests that the prison file did not make out an incident to 
be as serious as Appellant characterizes it. Although the incident 
at E8:175 did involve the non-delivery of a TV and stereo, the 
officer stated in the chronological note that he had told Ralph "it 
appeared like a strongarm situation." Judge Uno explicitly referred 
to "strongarm tactics" in sentencing Ralph to death. Hence, despite 
the lack of reliable evidence or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
Judge Uno may have relied on this unreliable report in determining 
sentence. 
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In contrast to the numerous decisions recognizing a right 
to confrontation in the penalty phase, the State cites only one 
recent case which directly addresses the issue and concludes that 
the right to confrontation does not exist in the penalty phase of a 
capital trial. See Sivak v. State, 731 P.2d 1292, 209-11 (Idaho 
1986). The other cases cited by the State do not directly address 
the confrontation issue. 
Although the State is correct that the United States 
Supreme Court has recently cited Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 
(1949) (State's brief at 136), the high Court has not cited Williams 
for the proposition that the right to confrontation does not exist 
in the penalty phase of a capital trial. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 
504 U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 178, 118 L.Ed.2d 437, 460 (1992) (cited in 
dissenting opinion for proposition related to sentencing models); 
Dawson v. Delaware, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (cited for proposition that past 
cases have given sentencer the authority to consider a range of 
relevant material); Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 798, 109 S.Ct. 
2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865, 872 (1989) (same); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 
U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2704, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 868 (1991) 
(concurring opinion compares penological goals in Williams with 
those in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363-66, 109 S.Ct. 
647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989)); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365 (cited 
after outlining "'three-way sharing' of sentencing responsibility11 
in federal system); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 710, 110 S.Ct. 
3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511, 565 n.2 (1990). 
Nor does Sanwick, 713 P.2d at 708, cite Williams for the 
proposition that the right to confrontation does not exist during 
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the penalty phase of a capital case. Indeed, Sanwick, a noncapital 
case, recognizes that even in a nondeath case, "the sentencing 
process must satisfy the requirements of due process.11 Id. 
The State cites several cases on pages 138-9 for the 
proposition that "[p]rison records and presentence reports are 
commonly recognized as reliable for sentencing.11 Other than Sivak, 
731 P.2d at 209-11, these cited cases do not directly address the 
confrontation issue. See, e.g., People v. Ward, 609 N.E.2d 252 
(111. 1992) (acknowledging it had previously held that prison 
records were "unreliable for purposes of the guilt phase of the 
trial" because such records are generally prepared "with an eye 
towards some form of subsequent discipline," but upholding admission 
during sentencing, primarily because the victim of the most serious 
recorded incident testified at the sentencing hearing); Bassette v. 
Thompson, 915 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1990).22 
Admission of the prison file violated Appellant's right to 
confrontation at the penalty hearing. 
22. The other cases cited by the State at 138-9 either did not 
involve death sentences or the records were admitted under different 
circumstances for limited purposes. None of the cited cases 
involved the wholesale admission for purposes of determining whether 
to impose a death sentence, as occurred in the instant case. For 
instance, in Walden v. United States, 306 A.2d 1075, 1076 (D.C. 
1978), the trial court reviewed prison records for the limited 
purpose of determining whether there was rehabilitation in deciding 
a motion to reduce a 5 to 15 year sentence two years after the 
sentence was imposed. In Smith v. State, 676 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Cr. 
App. 1984), the court acknowledged the application of the right to 
confrontation in the penalty phase of a capital trial, but held that 
a certified report of the warden that the defendant had attempted to 
escape had sufficient indicia of reliability to allow its 
admission. In reaching its decision, however, the court recognized 
that "the State may well have been skating on thin ice in utilizing 
the report in place of witnesses." Smith, 676 S.W.2d at 392. 
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C THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS 
REQUIRE THE EXCLUSION OF DISCIPLINARY REPORTS AT 
THE PENALTY PHASE. 
As outlined in Appellant's opening brief at 133-5, the due 
process requirements of trial do not apply to a disciplinary hearing 
in the prison. The State must prove that a violation occurred by 
only a preponderance of the evidence. See E8:223. This lesser 
standard does not meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
articulated in State v. Woodf 648 P.2d 71 (Utah 1981), and mandated 
by due process under the fourteenth amendment and Article 1, 
Section 7 of the Utah constitution and the protection against cruel 
and unusual punishment guaranteed by Article 1, Section 9 of the 
Utah constitution and the eighth amendment. See Wood, 648 P.2d at 
83-4; Holland, 777 P.2d at 1026. Furthermore, admission of 
disciplinary reports which are not proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
results in the admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence which 
violates due process and the eighth amendment as explained in 
State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988). In other words, 
disciplinary events such as the stabbing of an inmate (E8:226-30) 
have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. 
In addition, while some forms indicate that Appellant was 
given the opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary 
evidence,23 he did not have an attorney to help him facilitate these 
procedures. Without an attorney, such an opportunity is an empty 
right in the due process context applicable during the penalty 
23. It is not clear from the file that such protections were 
afforded at all disciplinary proceedings. For example, the 
documents relating to the disciplinary proceeding on the stabbing of 
an inmate do not include information that these opportunities were 
made available in those proceedings. E8:226-30; see also E8:221-5. 
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phase. See generally Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 
L.Ed.158 (1932), and its progeny (recognizing importance of counsel 
to fair proceeding). Disciplinary hearings which have not been 
subjected to the more rigorous protections afforded at trial result 
in determinations that do not meet the reliability requirements for 
a capital sentencing proceeding. See Holland, 777 P.2d at 1026-7; 
Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10-11. 
Finally, forms which outline an individual's rights at a 
disciplinary hearing are found throughout the prison file. In 
addition to making the statement quoted by Appellant on pages 134-5 
of his opening brief and the State on page 144, the forms state: 
Pursuant to the inherent protections against 
being compelled to be a witness against yourself 
in any criminal prosecution as provided by the 
Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, we advise you that any statements 
made by you during this disciplinary hearing, or 
any evidence derived directly or indirectly 
therefrom, may not be used affirmatively against 
you in any subsequent criminal prosecution which 
relates to the incident(s) for which you are 
being heard before this committee today. 
E8:221 (emphasis added). 
An individual reading these warnings would be left with the 
understanding that any statements made by him or her would not be 
used in a subsequent criminal proceeding where the State was 
attempting to impose a death sentence based in part on his or her 
conduct in prison. In addition, when the State introduces penalty 
phase evidence, it is attempting to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that "the act" occurred and should be considered at sentencing. 
This case involves a "criminal prosecution which relates to the 
incidents" which were being heard since the State used those 
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incidents in an attempt to obtain a death sentence. Hence, these 
forms pertain directly to the introduction at the penalty phase of 
statements made by Ralph after receiving such warnings. 
Statements made by Ralph at these hearings appear 
throughout the file and were considered at the penalty hearing 
despite the promises to the contrary. E.g. E8:223, 227-8, 244, 251, 
252, 258. Use of these statements is a further violation of the 
fifth amendment, due process and the eighth amendment. See 
People v. Fisher, 657 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1983) (videotape made after 
defendant told it would not be used in criminal proceeding properly 
suppressed); Morris v. State, 436 So.2d 1381, 1386 (Miss. 1983) 
(violation where state introduced statement made by defendant after 
officer told defendant statement would not be used); Santobello v. 
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 427 (1971) (promise made by 
government enforced by court). 
POINT XVIII. THE PRISON FILE CONTAINED 
ALLEGATIONS OF UNADJUDICATED VIOLENT CRIMINAL 
ACTS WHICH THE STATE DID NOT PROVE BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT, REQUIRING A NEW PENALTY PHASE. 
In Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1260, n.16, this Court explicitly 
required a trial judge determining sentence in a capital case to 
make specific written findings as to "whether the other crime was 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." This requirement applies 
regardless of whether the conduct is proved; it does not limit such 
findings to only the circumstance where unadjudicated conduct is 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The State claims that the judge did not make findings and 
therefore it must be assumed that he did not rely on unadjudicated 
conduct. State's brief at 143. This Court cannot make such an 
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assumption for several reasons. First, Lafferty tells the trial 
judge to make written findings either way.24 Second, the whole 
point of the findings, as explicitly discussed by this Court, is "to 
assure that on review this Court can adequately assess whether 
imposition of a death sentence has been improperly based on evidence 
of other crimes which have not been proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1260 n.16. Third, the logical 
assumption, given the nature of the allegations and the prejudicial 
impact of evidence of other crimes on a fact finder, is that the 
judge would be affected by this unproven other acts evidence. 
Finally, and most importantly, the judge explicitly stated 
that he considered much of the unproven other crimes evidence. 
T. 3248-75; see entire transcript of Judge's ruling in imposing 
death sentence.25 Although the State claims in its brief at 144 
that "[d]efendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court relied 
24. There is a suggestion in the record that the trial judge 
misunderstood the burden of proof necessary to establish that items 
in the prison record could be relied upon in sentencing. Judge Uno 
stated: 
The Court; Unless it rises to the level of some 
kind of criminal conduct, the prison records, if 
they meet the burden of the prison standards in 
regards to preponderance of the evidence, even 
though there's no right to confront on some of 
these matters, the Court is going to have to just 
give that the weight which the Court feels it 
deserves, and the objections essentially will be 
overruled. 
T. 3138. While the meaning of this passage is far from clear, it 
raises a question as to whether the trial judge believed that 
preponderance of the evidence was the proper standard for reviewing 
information in the prison file. This passage lends further support 
to Appellant's argument that the trial judge did not understand nor 
follow Lafferty. In addition, this passage should dissuade this 
Court from presuming that the trial judge only considered relevant 
and competent evidence in assessing sentence. 
25. Footnote on following page. 
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on improper State's evidence#" a review of Appellant's opening brief 
at 135-6, 138 indicates otherwise. For example, the judge 
explicitly relied on "strong arm tactics, threats to inmates and 
guards." T. 3260. The State did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Appellant committed any of the "strong arm tactics" which 
appear in the prison file.26 
The State introduced the unadjudicated conduct as 
aggravating evidence in an attempt to obtain a death sentence. The 
State's claim that the file was introduced not as aggravating 
evidence, but only "to rebut the defense contention that defendant 
could be rehabilitated" (State's brief at 143) is not supported by 
the record. The State introduced the file during its penalty phase 
case in chief before Defendant offered any evidence. T. 2884.27 
25. The judge prefaced his statements when imposing sentence by 
saying ". . .1 will go over the aggravating circumstances first, 
and then the mitigating circumstances . . . ." T. 3249. After 
discussing the circumstances, the judge pointed out that he had 
"weighed and evaluated the mitigating circumstances and aggravating 
circumstances. And the conclusion the court has reached is that 
based on the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court 
concludes that the aggravating circumstances outweighs the 
mitigating circumstances." T. 3268. It is apparent that the trial 
judge considered all of the factors mentioned between these two 
statements. To assume that he did not contradicts that which 
appears in the record. 
26. Other examples of unadjudicated conduct not proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt include allegations of a stabbing incident 
(E8:105:2), a triple hearsay report alleging a "serious AWOL plot," 
threats with a knife and assaults (E8:104) and threats of violence 
(E8:83). 
27. Prosecutor Jones did argue that he was not offering the file 
"as evidence of prior bad acts"; instead, he claimed that he was 
offering the file "because it goes to the defendant's background, it 
goes to his character, it goes to the questions of ability to 
rehabilitate this man." T. 2890. The prosecutor's argument makes a 
distinction without a difference. Even if the prosecutor's argument 
was accepted, that argument is essentially that the bad acts in the 
(continued) 
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The wholesale introduction of the prison file and the trial 
judge's reliance thereon requires a new penalty phase. 
POINT IXX. THE STATE'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE 
APPELLANT WITH A COPY OF THE PRISON FILE REQUIRES 
A NEW PENALTY HEARING. 
Appellant filed a pretrial motion for discovery and the 
prosecutor provided Appellant with discovery• R- 27-8. Appellant 
also made an oral supplemental motion to discover and filed an 
additional motion to require the State to disclose penalty phase 
witnesses. R. 628, 772-3.28 
The State acknowledges that "[defendant's statements 
reported in psychological evaluations and self-evaluations arguably 
fell within the terms of defendant's rule 16 request.11 State's 
brief at 148. As set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 140, the 
file also contained other information which was explicitly requested. 
The State was the only party with access to the file and 
had an obligation under Rule 16 to provide the information conceded 
(Footnote 27 continued) 
file show that Appellant is a bad actor who cannot be rehabilitated; 
to reach the determination sought by the State that Appellant could 
not be rehabilitated, the judge first had to determine that he 
committed the acts alleged in the file. 
28. Although Appellant's discovery motion covered the contents of 
the file, this Court should note that it is not clear in this case 
that Defendant did not file a Bill of Particulars. The penalty 
phase discovery motions present one of the "fuzzy11 areas created by 
the irregular preparation and compilation of the record in this 
case. A motion refers to a January 22, 1988 hearing on discovery. 
R. 772. No such hearing has surfaced. A hearing on penalty phase 
discovery was held January 25, 1988; that transcript is not 
presently included in the record. 
Appellate counsel recalls discussing the bill of 
particulars discussion in Lafferty with defense counsel Palacios 
after this Court issued its opinion in Lafferty. If this Court 
believes supplementation of the record is required on this issue, 
Appellant respectfully requests that this case be temporarily 
remanded to the trial court for supplementation on this issue. 
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by the State and argued by Appellant. Defense counsel reasonably 
prepared her case believing that the State was calling Beverley 
Tischler to introduce prior convictions in this circumstance where 
the State did not provide items explicitly requested. Because 
defendant had no access to these reports and was not clearly 
notified that the State intended to introduce them, this failure was 
not mitigated, as claimed by the State. 
In addition, the State was providing defense counsel with 
discovery and defense counsel was reasonably relying on the State to 
do so. Indeed, the prosecutor indicated that he had "thousands of 
conversations with defense counsel." T. 1820-1. The State told 
defense counsel it was calling Beverly Tischler.29 Defense counsel 
asked the purpose for calling Tischler, and the State responded that 
"she was for the prison record." T. 2840, 2888. As defense counsel 
explained, the State uses Hinckley or Tischler to put on a 
defendant's prior convictions, using the judgments included in the 
prison record. T. 2840, 2888. The State was aware that these women 
are used for that purpose and that putting on an entire prison file 
was an unusual, if not unprecedented, move by the State. 
Nevertheless, the State did not provide counsel with a copy of that 
file, despite the existence of defendant's discovery motion which 
covered the contents of the file. T. 2888. Under such 
circumstances, the State violated its discovery duties and failed to 
give defense counsel adequate notice that it intended to introduce 
this unusual and unanticipated evidence. 
29. The State ultimately substituted June Hinckley for Tischler. 
T. 2888. 
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The State points out that defense counsel had one evening 
and the hour and a half lunch break during the penalty phase to 
review this extensive file. T. 2899, 3128. The file consists of 
over 333 pages, some of which are filled with a number of entries. 
Requiring defense counsel to use precious breaks during this long 
and complicated trial to digest and respond to this extensive amount 
of information put defense counsel at a serious disadvantage. 
Defense counsel's review during this limited period was for 
the purpose of being able to state objections on the record. 
T. 2899. Obviously, during this short period of time, much of 
which was after hours, defense counsel was not able to contact the 
many people to which statements in the file were attributed, prison 
personnel, experts to rebut information in the file, or otherwise 
make any investigation in regard to the information in the file. 
This short period of time did not render the discovery error 
harmless, as claimed by the State. 
As discussed supra at 18-21, a motion to continue is not 
required to preserve all discovery violations for review. The 
appropriate remedy for a discovery violation is that which is most 
tailored to alleviate the harm. See Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d at 507; 
Elledqe, 613 So.2d at 436 (reversing death sentence where State 
failed to provide defendant with prison records). Defense counsel 
objected to the file on numerous grounds; the notice objection was 
included. Defense counsel also indicated at one point that she had 
not yet had an opportunity to review the file and that Mr. Menzies 
was previously unaware of portions of the file because they were 
confidential. T. 3128. She indicated further that she needed time 
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to discuss the matter with Menzies and determine whether they needed 
to call more witnesses. T. 3128. 
This penalty phase was already under way when defense 
counsel learned of this information. Defense counsel obtained as 
much additional time as possible during the course of the penalty 
phase to review this file. Under these circumstances and a due 
process and eighth amendment concern for fundamental fairness, a 
motion for continuance was not a prerequisite for preserving this 
issue. 
Finally, as set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 
120-6, the due process requirement of reliability and the eighth 
amendment requirement of heightened reliability in a capital case 
govern this penalty phase. The lack of notice in this case 
adversely affects the reliability of this proceeding, in violation 
of due process and the eighth amendment. See Gardner v. Florida, 
430 U.S. 349 (1977). 
POINT XX. ADMISSION OF THE PRISON FILE VIOLATED 
APPELLANTS RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
As set forth supra at 43-4, use of Menzies' statements in 
the prison file, following warnings that such statements would not 
be used, violated Appellant's right against self-incrimination. 
Although the State claims that authorities did not 
"interrogate" Menzies in compiling the various presentence reports 
and evaluations, a review of those documents and common sense 
indicates otherwise. For example, the "Mollner report" contains 
"Defendant's version" of the incident, obtained "from an interview" 
between the "investigator" and defendant. E8:83:l. It appears that 
"investigator" Mollner went through the categories in the report and 
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asked defendant questions relevant to those categories. See Health 
and Future Goals sections ("Mr. Menzies related to this investigator 
that his future goals are ..." E8:83:7). 
The other evaluations are also "interviews" in which the 
evaluator interrogated Ralph. See E8:105 (evaluator interviewed 
Ralph on three occasions; had to prepare Ralph in order to get him 
to give information); E8:108, 109, 110 (psychological assessments by 
Dr. Carlisle at prison). 
The interviews by various evaluators contained in the 
prison file implicated the fifth amendment in the same way 
Dr. Grigson's interview of the defendant implicated the fifth 
amendment in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 
L.Ed.2d 359, 369 (1981). 
Defense counsel made a number of objections after a hurried 
review of the file. T. 2839-40, 2843, 2885, 2886, 2892-3, 2894, 
3132-4, 3135. To the extent defense counsel did not specifically 
mention the right against self-incrimination, this issue should have 
been obvious to the trial judge; the doctrine of plain error and the 
fact that this is a capital case require that this Court review this 
issue. See generally State v. Palmer/ 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah 
App. 1993) (applying plain error doctrine in noncapital cases); 
Tillman# 750 P.2d at 551 (discussing concept of waiver as it applies 
to capital cases). 
POINT XXVII. APPLICATION OF THE HEINOUSNESS 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY 
PHASE. 
This issue addresses one of the aggravating circumstances 
found by the trial judge. T. 3250. A defendant need not object to 
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the sufficiency of the evidence to challenge a judge's verdict on 
appeal. In addition, where the trial judge has had the opportunity 
to consider the issue, the purposes of the waiver rule are not 
served. See Johnson I, 821 P.2d at 1161 (one of purposes of waiver 
rules is to ensure that trial judge has first opportunity to review 
the issue; "justification for rigid waiver requirements is weakened" 
where judge has had opportunity to review issue). 
In the present case, the State argued in both opening and 
rebuttal that the heinousness aggravator applied (T. 3209, 3236-7). 
Defense counsel expressly took issue with the application of this 
aggravating circumstance. T. 3222. The trial judge decided that 
the aggravating factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
T. 3250. This issue was fully presented to the trial judge and 
decided by that judge and is properly before this Court. 
Various courts have determined that the trier of fact 
improperly applied the heinousness aggravator. See, e.g., Booker v. 
State, 851 P.2d 544, 548 (Okla. 1993) ("record does not support a 
finding of mental anguish beyond that which necessarily accompanied 
the underlying killing"); Crawford v. State, 840 P.2d 627, 640 
(Okla. 1992) (insufficient evidence to support heinousness 
aggravator where decedent killed by blunt force and manual 
strangulation and no showing that decedent did not die instantly); 
Lawrence v. State , 614 So.2d 1092, 1097 (Fla. 1993) (murder not 
heinous, atrocious or cruel since "nothing sets this murder 'apart 
from the norm of capital felonies'"); Richardson v. State, 604 So.2d 
1107, 1109 (Fla. 1992) (murder not heinous, atrocious or cruel where 
evidence did not establish that murder was "both conscienceless or 
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pitiless and unnecessarily tortuous to the victim"). 
The medical examiner testified in this case that 
Ms. Hunsaker died quickly from "strangulation with stab wounds to 
the neck contributing to the death." The stab wounds and 
strangulation occurred close together in time. T. 1639, 1666-7. 
The State failed to establish its burden of proof under these 
circumstances that torture or serious physical abuse occurred before 
death. 
Although this Court has conducted a harmless error review 
and upheld a death sentence after an aggravating factor has fallen 
out (see Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1248 (Utah 1993)), such an approach 
should be used sparingly in light of the delicate calculus that 
occurs during a penalty phase, and the idea that an aggravating 
circumstance can act as the "thumb on the scale" and create 
"randomness" and "bias" in favor of the death penalty.30 
30. Utah's death penalty statute requires a jury or trial judge, 
not an appellate court, to impose sentence. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-207(1), (4). This Court has only appellate jurisdiction over 
capital cases. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2. Reweighing aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances and determining whether death is the 
appropriate penalty even though an aggravating circumstance has been 
removed is, in essence, a resentencing. The sentencer in a capital 
case should consider all mitigating evidence. Permitting an 
appellate court to impose a sentence using the technique of 
reweighing eliminates a crucial mechanism by which death cases can 
be narrowed or channeled and by which arbitrary imposition of the 
death penalty can be limited. Hence, this Court should not reweigh 
when the sentencer has relied on an improper aggravating 
circumstance. 
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that it does not 
have the authority "to reweigh remaining aggravating circumstances 
when it finds one or more to be invalid or improperly defined... ." 
Clemons v. State, 593 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Miss. 1992). See also 
Shell v. State, 595 So.2d 1323; Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d at 
1183. In Clemons v. State, 593 So.2d at 1006, the court relied on 
Mississippi's capital sentencing and death penalty appeal statutes 
(continued) 
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See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2119, 119 
L.Ed.2d 326 (1992). Although this Court's decision in Archuleta 
suggests that a harmless error analysis is appropriate where an 
aggravating circumstance drops out, reliance on an improper 
aggravating circumstance can create a greater impact than the 
erroneous admission of a piece of evidence.31 
(Footnote 30 continued) 
and the decision of the United States Supreme Court in demons v. 
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 741, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 1444, 108 L.Ed.2d 
725, 733 (1990), in determining that it did not have the authority 
to reweigh under state law. Tennessee has "generally held that the 
case must be remanded for a new hearing on punishment" when one of a 
number of aggravating circumstances has been set aside on appeal. 
State v. Branam, 855 S.W.2d 563, 570 (Tenn. 1993) (citing cases in 
support of that proposition). 
Although this Court conducted what it termed a "harmless 
error analysis after an aggravating circumstance dropped out in 
Archuleta. the Court essentially reweighed the evidence in those 
cases. Any time an aggravating circumstance drops out, as opposed 
to a determination that some other type of error occurred, the Court 
must actually "reweigh" the remaining evidence. For instance, if 
the Court were to determine that prosecutorial misconduct occurred 
during penalty phase closing argument, harmless error analysis is 
appropriate. However, if this Court were to determine that 
Judge Uno improperly relied on an aggravating circumstance, it must 
reweigh the remaining circumstances. It is Mr. Menzies' position 
that any such reweighing must occur in the trial court, and he 
respectfully requests that this Court reexamine the procedure 
utilized in Archuleta for determining whether a new penalty phase is 
required after an aggravating circumstance is removed on appeal. 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 895 (Utah 1989), may well 
support Appellant's position that reweighing is improper under our 
statutory scheme. In Carter, this Court held that improper reliance 
on an aggravating circumstance was not harmless error and remanded 
the case for a new penalty phase. This Court did not attempt to 
reweigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances in Carter. 
31. The State argues that reliance on an improper aggravating 
circumstance is harmless because the underlying evidence could still 
be considered. State's brief at 170 fn.56. Such an argument 
disregards the critical requirement set forth in Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 
and Holland, 777 P.2d at 1026, that the State prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating 
circumstances and that death is the appropriate penalty. Where an 
aggravating circumstance is inappropriately considered, the 
(continued) 
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In Archuleta , this Court upheld the death sentence after 
rejecting one of the aggravating circumstances. In so doing, this 
Court relied on the heinousness of the homicide for establishing the 
harmlessness of the invalid aggravating circumstance. 
Given the especially atrocious and depraved 
nature of the prolonged torture and eventual 
murder of Church and the relative lack of 
mitigating circumstances, we can confidently say 
beyond a reasonable doubt that even if the jury 
had not considered the invalid aggravator, it 
would have returned a verdict of death. 
Archuleta, 850 P.2d at 1248. 
By contrast, in the instant case, the heinousness 
aggravator is not applicable and significant mitigating evidence 
exists; hence, the aggravating factor that this Court relied on in 
Archuleta for its confidence in the death sentence is not applicable 
in this case. Archuleta supports the notion that the heinousness 
aggravator is a critical circumstance in assessing sentence. Its 
erroneous application in this case was not harmless error. 
Judge Uno's erroneous perception that the heinousness aggravator 
applied in this case may well have been the thumb on the scale which 
resulted in a death rather than life sentence. See Carter, 776 P.2d 
(Footnote 31 continued) 
determination under the first prong is upset. The eighth amendment 
requires that the Court then reweigh or conduct a harmless error 
review. See demons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738. The State's 
argument also disregards the recognition by the United States 
Supreme Court in Stringer v. Black, 112 S.Ct. at 2119, that finding 
an aggravating circumstance can result in the "thumb on the scale" 
which results in a death sentence. 
The fact that Judge Uno improperly relied on the 
heinousness aggravator means that he gave undue weight to the 
evidence as to the nature of the homicide. That error is not 
assuaged by determining that he simply relied on the underlying 
evidence. 
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at 895 (reversing death sentence and remanding for new penalty phase 
after heinousness aggravator removed). 
POINT XXIX. APPLICATION OF THE PECUNIARY GAIN 
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY 
HEARING. 
The trial judge explicitly relied on the pecuniary gain 
aggravating circumstance in assessing sentence. T. 3249-50.32 
The trial judge stated: 
In starting with the aggravating circumstances, I 
will start with the nature of the crime. One, 
... . Two, under 76-5-202(7)(f), "the homicide 
was committed for pecuniary or personal gain. 
T. 3249-50. The fact that the State neither argued nor charged this 
aggravating circumstance does not mitigate the trial judge's 
reliance on the factor. Indeed, the trial judge's sua sponte 
reliance on the factor heightens the prejudice since Defendant was 
deprived of notice that this factor was at issue. In addition, it 
should have heightened the trial judge's sense that the factor did 
not apply. 
In Robertson v. State, 611 So.2d 1228, 1233 (Fla. 1993), 
the court restated that 
... it is improper to double the consideration of 
the aggravating circumstances of robbery and 
pecuniary gain when both circumstances referred 
'to the same aspect of the defendant's crime.' 
[citation omitted]. In making this 
determination, the aggravating circumstances of 
robbery and pecuniary gain 'may not be considered 
individually when the only evidence that the 
crime was committed for pecuniary gain was the 
same evidence of the robbery underlying the 
capital crime. [citation omitted]. 
32. The transcript of the sentencing is found at T. 3248-3270. A 
copy of the entire transcript of the sentencing is contained in 
Addendum C to this brief. 
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See also Davis v. State, 604 So.2d 794, 798 (Fla. 1992) (doubling 
aggravating factors of burglary and pecuniary gain "is improper 
where the factors are based on the same aspect of the criminal 
episode"); Castro v. State, 597 So.2d 259, 261 (Fla. 1992) (reliance 
on robbery and pecuniary gain "constitutes improper doubling" of 
aggravating circumstances); Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1171 
(instructing jury that it could consider both robbery and pecuniary 
gain aggravating factors was reversible error). 
In State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1355 (Utah 1977), this 
Court did not directly address the issue raised by Appellant in this 
part. In Pierre, the defendant argued that instruction on the 
robbery aggravating circumstance "overlapped" with the instruction 
on pecuniary gain, and that pecuniary gain "should be limited to 
circumstances of 'a hired murder./M Id. This Court resolved the 
issue, stating: 
No error exists in having two instructions 
overlap in part. [footnote omitted] And nothing 
inheres in the wording "pecuniary gain" which 
compels the restrictive interpretation defendant 
places on it. 
Id . Nor did this Court directly address this issue in Young, 853 
P.2d at 336-7. 
Mr. Menzies' argument is that due process and the eighth 
amendment are violated where the identical evidence is used to 
establish two aggravating circumstances. Any pecuniary gain in this 
case was based on robbery and therefore did not fall under a 
distinct circumstance. In this case, the trial judge improperly 
relied on two aggravating circumstances which were based on the same 
evidence when he determined that aggravating circumstances 
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outweighed mitigating circumstances. 
The State again argues that any error was not prejudicial 
based on its claim that "facts, not labels, are weighed in the 
penalty phase." State's brief at 175. As set forth supra at 57, 
such an argument is incorrect. In Young, 853 P.2d at 364, this 
Court reiterated the two-prong test set forth in Wood. This Court 
then stated: 
In State v. Holland [777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989)], 
we emphasized the importance of both prongs of 
the Wood test. We noted that employing the first 
prong alone could produce an unduly broad 
application of the death penalty and could result 
in a mere numerical counting of the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances in each case, 
[footnote omitted]. The second prong of the Wood 
test serves the important function of allowing 
the jurors to look at the totality of the case in 
light of their societal values and personal 
experiences. 
The finding of aggravating circumstances is a critical step in the 
penalty determination. While the mere numerical counting of 
circumstances is improper, it does not follow that the finding of 
aggravating circumstances has no impact on the penalty decision. 
The trial judge's reliance on this additional circumstance 
may well have been the "thumb on the scale" which tipped the 
balance. In addition, the trial judge erroneously relied on more 
than one aggravating circumstance in this case. Under such 
circumstances, the erroneous reliance is not harmless and 
Mr. Menzies should be granted a new penalty hearing. 
POINT XXX. RELIANCE ON UNCHARGED AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY PHASE. 
While Appellant acknowledges this Court's holding in Young, 
853 P.2d at 352, that the sentencer can consider uncharged 
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aggravating circumstances in the penalty phase, for purposes of 
preserving this issue for federal review, Appellant continues to 
maintain that such a procedure violates federal due process and the 
eighth amendment. 
In addition, the decision in Young does not relate directly 
to the sua sponte reliance by the trier of fact on an uncharged 
aggravating circumstance which was not argued by the State. 
Mr. Menzies maintains that due process and the eighth amendment are 
violated where the trial judge sua sponte relies on an aggravating 
circumstance without any notice to defendant that the specific 
circumstance is being considered.33 
POINT XXXI. ADMISSION OF ADULT AND JUVENILE RAP 
SHEETS DURING THE PENALTY PHASE WAS REVERSIBLE 
ERROR. 
In this point, Appellant argues that the rap sheets were 
inadmissible for a number of reasons, and that the State was 
required to present more reliable evidence in order to establish 
Mr. Menzies' criminal record. 
In State v. Diazy 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 31 (Utah App. 
1993), the Court of Appeals recently stated: 
It is readily apparent that a "rap sheet," which 
does not fit within any of the permissible means 
of admitting evidence of a prior conviction, is 
not a properly reliable method of establishing 
the existence of that prior conviction. 
In reaching its decision that rap sheets are not admissible, 
33. Furthermore, a jury would not have had the free rein to find 
any statutory aggravating circumstance and would have been limited 
to the aggravating circumstances on which it was instructed. 
Mr. Menzies waived his right to a jury during the penalty phase 
without notice that the judge might sua sponte rely on additional 
aggravating circumstances. 
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reliable evidence, the Diaz court relied on this Court's decision in 
State v. Peterson, 560 P.2d 1387, 1390 (Utah 1977). 
In State v. Peterson,r1# the Utah Supreme Court 
held that evidence of a prior conviction is only 
admissible if it is shown by (1) the oral 
testimony of the witness himself, (2) the court 
record of such conviction, or (3) a properly 
certified copy thereof- Id. at 1390 (quoting 
Wright v. State, 38 Ala. 420, 79 So.2d 66, 68 
(1954), cert, denied 262 Ala. 420, 79 So.2d 74 
(1955)). 
Diaz, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. at 31. 
Admission of such unreliable evidence violates due 
process. See Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. In addition, 
imposing a death sentence based on unreliable evidence violates the 
eighth amendment. See Young, 853 P.2d at 376 ("Because #death is 
different,' the State imposes capital punishment only after 
following the strictest legal and constitutional safeguards."). 
Furthermore, the State has failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that such crimes occurred, in violation of due 
process and the eighth amendment. See Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1259; 
see also Arnett v. Ricketts, 665 F.Supp. at 1444 (rap sheet and 
prison records were hearsay which did not establish aggravating 
circumstance). 
The State argued: 
PROSECUTOR JONES: Another mitigating factor in 
the State is a lack of criminal record. Again, 
that is not a factor because the Court knows 
about Ralph Menzies' prior record. 
T. 3209. 
The trial judge expressly relied on the rap sheets in 
sentencing Appellant to death. 
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JUDGE UNO: Then prior criminal history, 
76-3-207(2)(a), one, there was an extensive 
juvenile court record from 4-13-66, at the age of 
seven when he was initially referred essentially 
because he needed to have a place to stay, up 
until approximately December 1st of 1975, and it 
may be sometime in 1976. In between that time 
there are approximately 38 referrals made. 
Two, and sometime in 1976, he was certified 
to the district court. 
Three, there was extensive criminal record. 
T. 3250. This unreliable and inadmissible evidence was important to 
the judge's decision and prejudicial to Mr. Menzies; a new penalty 
hearing is required. 
POINT XXXII. ADMISSION OF GRUESOME PHOTOGRAPHS 
OF THE BODY WAS ERROR. 
Despite this Court's recognition in Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 
1256, 1259, that photographs of a corpse have a strong propensity to 
prejudice the fact finder and its application of Rule 403, Utah 
Rules of Evidence in both the guilt and penalty phases, the State 
asks the Court to essentially overrule its decision in Lafferty and 
allow gruesome photographs of the body during the penalty phase. 
The State offers no convincing argument for overruling recent 
precedent. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey , 505 U.S. 
, 112 S.Ct. 931, 120 L.Ed.2d 676, 699-700 (1992) (recognizing 
importance of precedent and outlining circumstances to be considered 
when determining whether to overrule a decision). 
The heightened need for reliability in the penalty phase of 
a capital trial and the requirement that persons eligible be 
narrowed and decisions carefully channeled suggest that exclusion of 
prejudicial and inflammatory photographs of a corpse are as critical 
in the penalty phase as they are in the guilt/innocence phase of a 
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capital trial. 
The State claims that the photographs were required to 
establish the heinousness aggravator. However, as outlined supra at 
51-4 and in Appellants opening brief at 158-63, the heinousness 
aggravator is applicable only where the State establishes torture or 
serious physical abuse or bodily injury before death. These 
photographs do not establish any of the required elements. Indeed, 
the medical examiner's testimony was the best evidence on the role 
of the wounds. 
The photographs are also of minimal if any relevance to the 
heinousness aggravator or any other issue since they do not show the 
wounds as they actually occurred and instead show wounds that gape 
more and dark patterns which appear to be wounds but are not. 
T. 1669. The State claims that the fact that the photographs did 
not accurately depict the wounds was not misleading because 
Dr. Sweeney explained "this fact and its cause" at trial. State's 
brief at 182 fn. 68. Regardless of whether the photographs were 
misleading, they lacked probative value because of their failure to 
accurately depict the wounds. 
Furthermore, Dr. Sweeney's guilt/innocence phase testimony 
failed to adequately clarify the problems with the photographs which 
would be introduced later, during the penalty phase. While 
Dr. Sweeney did talk generally about the difference between the 
actual wounds and the wounds after the autopsy was performed, his 
testimony during the guilt/innocence phase did not relate directly 
to the photographs and did not outline the specific problems with 
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the photographs. 
In addition, while the judge presided over the jury trial 
during the guilt/innocence phase, he was not yet aware that he was 
to be the fact finder in the penalty phase.34 Under such 
circumstances, Dr. Sweeney's testimony failed to explain for the 
judge that the photographs did not provide an accurate 
representation of the wounds. 
The State's own argument emphasizes the importance of 
limiting the use of gruesome photographs in a penalty phase. The 
State argues that lf[e]vidence communicating the nature and 
circumstances of the crime will frequently be gruesome. Murder is a 
gruesome act.11 State's brief at 182-3. 
While murder is gruesome, the goal of the penalty phase is 
to select those gruesome murders which, within eighth amendment and 
due process guidelines, warrant the death penalty. The State's 
argument does not support wholesale admission of such gruesome 
photos; rather, it suggests that since all murders are gruesome in 
their own way, the use of photographs of the body of a murder victim 
must be carefully limited so that horror or other emotional 
reactions in viewing the photographs do not unduly prejudice the 
fact finder in assessing sentence.35 
34. Indeed, the death qualification procedure utilized during 
voir dire suggested that the judge would not be the penalty phase 
fact finder. 
35. Although "the State assumes for purposes of this argument that 
the photographs in question are gruesome" (State's brief at 178) and 
recognizes the gruesome nature of almost all photographs of murder 
victims, it is interesting to note that the State has chosen to 
compare the photographs admitted in the present case with the 
(continued) 
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The State also argues that since a judge, not jury, looked 
at these photographs, no prejudice occurred. State's brief at 
183-4. While a judge may have to examine a photograph in order to 
make the admissibility determination, his cursory examination for 
that purpose is different than the examination made in determining 
whether the homicide was heinous or whether the photographs 
otherwise supported a death sentence. 
In addition, although the State would like this Court to 
presume that the trial judge relied on only admissible evidence 
(State's brief at 183-4), such a presumption is not appropriate 
where the record establishes that the judge admitted inadmissible 
evidence and may well have relied on the photographs in finding the 
heinousness aggravator. The photographs may well have impacted on 
the judge's determination that the heinousness aggravator applied. 
The problems with admitting these photographs are not minimized by 
the fact that this penalty phase was tried to the judge; reliance on 
the photos to find an aggravating circumstance results in reversible 
error. 
(Footnote 35 continued) 
gruesome photograph of a war victim which was placed on the cover of 
a national magazine to emphasize the atrocities of that war. 
State's brief at 178 fn. 64. The State seems to suggest in footnote 
64 that perhaps the photographs in the instant case are not gruesome 
because "they are comparable to a photograph recently appearing on 
the cover of Newsweek magazine." On the contrary, the magazine 
cover selected by the State, which it acknowledges is comparable to 
the photographs at issue, is gruesome, shocking and intended to 
evoke an emotional response. It was selected for the cover for that 
very reason. Although this magazine cover is not part of the record 
in the instant case, it supports Appellant's argument that the 
gruesome photographs should not have been admitted. 
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POINT XXXIII. THE TRIAL JUDGE'S RELIANCE ON 
SPECULATION THAT APPELLANT MIGHT BE PAROLED 
REQUIRES A NEW PENALTY HEARING. 
The State claims that the prosecutor "made a 'what if7 
argument which was amply supported" by the evidence. State's brief 
at 186. A "what if argument" is speculation; speculation should not 
be considered in determining whether to sentence an individual to 
death. As Appellant pointed out in his opening brief, there is no 
evidence in this case that Appellant would be paroled.36 
Appellant's opening brief at 176-7. 
In Young, 853 P.2d at 421, Justice Stewart recognized that 
"[s]ociety can protect itself by imprisoning dangerous people for 
life." In a footnote, Justice Stewart emphasized that argument by 
prosecutors that the death penalty should be imposed because the 
defendant might be paroled and kill again 
... is disingenuous, unprofessional, and improper 
and should be prohibited by all trial judges. It 
assumes that the Board of Pardons will not keep 
those who are a danger to others in prison, for 
life if necessary. Nothing in the history of the 
State of Utah indicates that the Board has been 
remiss in its duty. 
Id. at 421 fn.4; see also Arthur v. State, 575 So.2d 1165, 1185 
(Ala. Cr. App. 1990) (improper for prosecutor to argue possibility 
of parole). 
The State claims that Tillman, 750 P.2d at 561, is on 
point, suggesting that this issue involves "invited error." State's 
36. Appellant's argument in footnote 72 of his opening brief at 177 
was intended to state that the prosecutor argued that Ralph might 
get out of prison at the age of 49, and that such argument was a 
misstatement of the evidence. A portion of the prosecutor's 
argument was inadvertently omitted from Appellant's opening brief. 
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brief at 186. The record does not support this claim. In his 
initial closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the judge 
should impose death because the Board of Pardons might parole 
Mr. Menzies. The trial judge relied on the possibility of parole in 
imposing sentence: 
Life imprisonment is no guarantee. The Board of 
Pardons may release or parole in spite of 
recommendations. He may escape. Average 
commitment 20 years. Defendant in for two 
five-to-life's and out in six years. 
T. 3254. 
Speculation that the Board of Pardons will not do its job 
and will prematurely release a person convicted of murder is not a 
proper basis for imposing a death sentence. See People v. Holman# 
469 N.E.2d 119, 134,135 (111. 1984); Young, 853 P.2d at 421 
(Stewart, J.). 
POINT XXXV. SPECULATION THAT THE DEFENDANT MIGHT 
ESCAPE IS NOT A PROPER BASIS FOR IMPOSING DEATH. 
The State did not present any evidence that any person has 
ever escaped from Uintah, the current maximum security facility at 
the Utah State Prison. Nor did the State present any evidence that 
Ralph Menzies would be housed in any unit other than the maximum 
security facility if he were sentenced to life. Appellant's single 
escape involved a walkaway from a minimum security unit a number a 
years ago. Under these circumstances, the State's argument that 
Ralph might escape and therefore should be sentenced to death was 
speculation which was not supported by the evidence. 
In Howard v. State, 800 P.2d 175, 178 (Nev. 1990), the 
Court pointed out that in Collier v. State, 705 P.2d 1126, 1130 
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(Nev. 1985), it held that the "prospect of escape is not part of the 
calculus that the jury should consider in determining a defendant's 
sentence." In Howard, the court modified the Collier rule, stating 
that it would allow such argument if supported by the evidence. 
Despite this modification, the court held in Howard that the 
argument was improper because it was not supported by the evidence. 
The trial judge's reliance on this prejudicial argument 
that Appellant might escape if given a life sentence requires a new 
penalty hearing. 
POINT XXXVI. IMPROPER ARGUMENT REQUIRES A NEW 
PENALTY PHASE. 
While the State cites cases from other jurisdictions which 
it claims allow argument comparing the defendant to notorious 
killers (State's brief at 190), it disregards the controlling case 
law from this Court. In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 
1984), this Court held that 
The prosecutor also committed misconduct when he 
compared the defendant to Hinckley. Such a 
comparison could have no effect other than to 
prejudice the jury. 
Id. at 486. Based on the comparison and other misconduct, this 
Court reversed the conviction in Troy. See also State v. Palmer, 
218 Utah Adv. Rep. 19; State v. Emmettf 831 P.2d 731 (Utah 1992). 
The State's reliance on a 1976 psychological report found 
in the prison file at E8:105 to establish that Appellant was a 
psychopath further demonstrates the weakness of this claim and the 
unreliability of the prison file. A social worker interviewed a 
seventeen-year-old Ralph Menzies three times during an eight-day 
period in February, 1976, for the purpose of assisting the court in 
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deciding whether to certify Appellant to stand trial as an adult. 
E8:105. In his "Impressions and Recommendations/1 the social worker 
stated, lfI believe there is ample evidence for a psychopathic 
deviant, character-disordered diagnosis." The State claims that 
this ancient, double hearsay based on the social worker's 
impressions of a juvenile Ralph Menzies spawned and made acceptable 
the prosecutor's extensive argument on psychopaths and comparisons 
to psychopathic killers. State's brief at 190-1. Such unreliable 
evidence should play no role in sentencing an individual to death. 
See generally Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (reliance on double 
hearsay evidence at sentencing violates due process). 
Finally, the State again argues that because this was a 
bench trial, the improper argument did not matter. If this Court 
were to accept the State's argument, it would be an invitation for 
improper argument in bench trials. Trial judges are human beings; 
they can be swayed by emotions and prejudice just as other human 
beings can be so swayed. This particular judge was relatively new 
to the district court bench when he tried this case and had never 
tried a capital case. He admitted and relied upon inadmissible 
evidence. Under such circumstances, it cannot be presumed that this 
argument did not affect himf especially in light of his explicit 
concern that Ralph might escape or be paroled. 
POINT XXXVII. ADMISSION OF VICTIM IMPACT 
EVIDENCE WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Although Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 2597, 
115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), held that the federal constitution did not 
bar the admission of victim impact evidence during the penalty 
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phase, it did not approve the use of victim impact evidence in the 
guilt phase of a capital trial. See Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 
1106, 1116 (Wyo. 1992) ("Consideration of victim-impact testimony or 
argument remains inappropriate during proceedings determining the 
guilt of an accused" after Payne); Clark v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d 
793, 796 (Ky. 1992) (conviction reversed where victim impact 
evidence introduced in guilt phase); Arthur v. State, 575 So.2d at 
1184 (comments during guilt phase regarding boys' loss of their 
father highly improper and prejudicial). In the present case, some 
of the victim impact evidence regarding Ms. Hunsaker's young 
children and unemployed husband came in during the guilt/innocence 
phase (T. 975-6, 978-9, 982, 988) in violation of Mr. Menzies' right 
to due process and a fair trial. 
Although this Court acknowledged the decision in Payne v. 
Tennessee in its decision in Young, 853 P.2d at 353, it did not 
address the state constitutional argument, as outlined in 
Appellant's opening brief at 186-7. 
This error should have been obvious to the trial judge 
since Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), was in effect at the 
time this case was tried, and the prejudicial impact of such 
evidence during the guilt phase is obvious. The fact that Booth was 
later overruled does not affect the obviousness of this error. 
Admission of this evidence during the guilt/innocence phase 
requires a new trial. See Clark v. Commonwealth, 833 S.W.2d at 796 
(reversing conviction after victim impact evidence admitted in 
guilt/innocence phase). In addition, reliance by the judge on this 
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victim impact evidence in sentencing Appellant to death (T. 3265, 
3259) requires a new penalty phase, under the Utah constitution. 
POINT XXXVIII. THE TESTIMONY OF DR. SMITH 
VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT. 
The testimony of Dr. Smith in the present case evidenced 
the same sort of unreliability as the ISAT report condemned by this 
Court in Johnson II, 218 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6-8. Accordingly, 
admission of the testimony violated due process. 
POINT XXXXI. THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY 
IN THIS CASE IS DISPROPORTIONATE. 
The death penalty has been imposed in Utah on only one 
other person who committed a murder during the commission of a 
robbery and who has not committed any other murders. See State v. 
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989). By contrast, in other cases 
where the death penalty has been imposed, the defendant had either 
committed other murders or committed the homicide while in the 
commission of a more atrocious aggravating circumstance or under 
more atrocious circumstances. 
Although the State suggests that Appellant's criminal 
history is sufficiently aggravating to justify a death sentence 
under the circumstances of this case, a review of the cases in which 
the death penalty has been imposed in Utah, affidavits presented by 
defense counsel as Defendant's Exhibit 35, and other Utah cases in 
which the defendant received a sentence less than death demonstrates 
that a violent criminal history coupled with a robbery aggravating 
circumstance is not usually sufficient for a death sentence.37 
37. Footnote on following page. 
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MISCELLANEOUS ARGUMENT 
POINT XXXXII. DEATH QUALIFICATION VIOLATES THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Although a majority of this Court upheld the death 
qualification procedure utilized in Young, 853 P.2d 327, three 
members expressed concern about the procedure and its impact on a 
defendant's right to a fair trial. Id. at 386-95. To the extent 
that a majority of this Court might be persuaded by further evidence 
regarding the impact on juries and possible alternatives, Appellant 
Menzies respectfully requests that this Court remand this case for 
an evidentiary hearing on this issue. 
POINT XXXXIII. THE UTAH DEATH PENALTY SCHEME IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
In Young, 853 P.2d 327, four members of this Court held 
that Utah's death penalty scheme is constitutional; one justice 
recognized the unconstitutionality of Utah's statutory scheme. 
Despite the majority opinion, and for purposes of preserving this 
issue for federal review, Appellant Menzies continues to maintain 
that Utah's death penalty scheme violates federal due process and 
the eighth amendment. 
37. The Hofmann case ("intentionally killed two people with bombs 
that endangered others") is just one example of the more notorious 
cases in which a defendant has not been sentenced to death in this 
state. 
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CONCLDSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Menzies respectfully 
requests that his convictions be reversed and the case remanded to 
the trial court for a new trial or dismissal. 
SUBMITTED this /3iUL day of October, 1993. 
^U^C.cdBf 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
RICHARD G. UDAY 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
I THE COURT: As to the panel as to a whole? 
J MS. BERGESON: Yeah. 
J THE COURT: You do. Evelyn, would you ask Mr. 
J Cole to come in, please? 
J EXAMINATION OF MR. COLE 
J By the Court: 
7 Q. Good morning, Mr. Cole. Have you a chair 
8 please, sir. Mr. Cole, I think you've probably seen 
9 everybody in the last couple of days that's in here in 
10 the courtroom. As I mentioned yesterday, we need to 
11 inquire a little further on some matters that may be 
12 considered sensitive, and so we thought we'd have this 
13 out of the presence of all the other potential jurors. I 
14 want to ask you a few questions, and explain some of the 
15 process in a little more detail, and then if counsel have 
16 additional questions, I'll give them an opportunity to 
17| put those to you as well. 
First, there was a couple of things to clear up what 
may have been by way of innuendo the day before. There 
may have been some suggestion that this case was the same 
21 case that you may have read about it the newspaper or 
221 heard on the TV where the fellow was hiding out in the 
23 mountains of West Virginia. Did you ever hear about that 
24 case? 
18 
19 
20 
25 A. NO. 
Page 8 
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR 
Q. This is not that case. So, if you didn't 
hear about it, don't worry about it. And also there was 
some suggestion that some of the jurors knew Mr- Young — 
potential jurors knew Mr. Young's relatives here in town. 
A. Yes ^  
Q. And the fact of the matter is, Mr. Young has 
no relatives in the State of Utah. I don't know if that 
makes any difference. I wanted to clear those things up 
because the parties agreed to that. 
A. The reason why I mentioned that is I did work 
with some Youngs at one time fifteen — sixteen years 
12 ago. 
13 Q. I believe you said that you thought you knew 
14 maybe the defendant's father? 
15 A. Father. Yeah. 
M Q* But in any case, I wanted to clear that up 
17j with you that he does not have any relatives in the State 
so that must have been some other Young. 
A. Well, you know, he looked quite a bit like 
the father. That's — you know. Some of my businesses 
21| faces. 
22 
18 
19 
20 
23 
241 
25 
THE COURT: I know. And you do an excellent 
job, too. You could do a little better on my legs but — 
particularly Bunny's. You'll recall, Mr. Cole, that you 
mentioned yesterday that the defendant in this case is 
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR 
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jl charged with criminal homicide, capital crime, murder in 
2 the first degree. And any crime that is a capital crime, 
3 and the only one in this State is murder, and only then 
4 certain types of murders, have the potential of the 
5 imposition of the death penalty. So we need to ask some 
6 questions about that, and we're talking hypothetically, 
7 assuming the jury ever got to the point of having to make 
8 that decision. The jury may or may not. And I'll come 
9 back to that in just a moment. 
10 With regard to your feelings toward the death 
11 penalty, you'll recall yesterday I asked the question 
12 generally of the panel as to any of those that were so 
13 unalterably opposed to the imposition of the death 
14 penalty that in no conceivable circumstance could they 
15 ever impose it. And you were not one of the individuals 
16 that raised your hand indicating you fell into that 
17 category; is that correct, sir? 
18
 A. That's true. 
19
 Q. How would you describe your feelings toward 
20
 the death penalty, then, Mr. Cole? Would you say you're 
21
 in favor of the death penalty, somewhat in favor of the 
22
 death penalty, somewhat opposed to the death penalty, or 
23| strongly opposed to the death penalty? 
A. I'm in favor of the death penalty. 
Q. In our system of laws in this State, Mr. 
24 
25 
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X Cole, there are only certain specified circumstances 
2 where one person kills another that are considered to be 
3 capital or first degree murder crimes, and the 
41 legislature has clearly idendified which of those 
5 circumstances apply. In other words, without some 
61 particular — unless the killing falls into a specific 
7 category, or a specific circumstance, it would not fall . 
81 into the category of first degree murder, it would be 
9 second degree murder, or manslaughter or something else. 
10 So, there are some homicides that are — that the death 
11 penalty is not available. In other words, it would be 
12 some other penalty, some lesser penalty. Do you 
13 understand that? 
14 A. Yes. Uh huh (Affirmative). 
15 Q. Regardless of you're feeling and personal 
16 beliefs towards the the death penalty, and it's merit or 
17 lack of merit, Mr. Cole, if you were chosen as a trial 
18 juror in this case do you believe that you'd be able to 
19 set aside any personal or moral beliefs that you may have 
20 and evaluate the evidence in this case in accordance with 
21 the instructions of law that I would give to you, and 
22 consider those along with your determination as to the 
23 what the facts are in this case, and determine what might 
24J be the appropriate penalty — this all assumes that the 
jury has found the defendant guilty of capital murder — 
Page 
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25 
and decide whether life imprisonment or the death penalty 
was appropriate? Would you be able to set aside any 
3 personal feelings about M R 1 'ic-^ t'h p Mnfl 'l V . ,,:t,, * f n " ' rm ' lle 
4 law, and follow your own determinations of the facts, and 
5 then decide whether death penalty was appropriate, or 
i .... ate? 
would believe 
8J U Has there ever been any time in your life, 
9 »I e iLlifit ", rjnii have been,, opposed to the death penalty? 
10 a i;i« 
11 y* Mi • Cole, rlo you Ikive am / persona I libel j.et u 
12 from whatever origin, and that might be religious on 
ij philosophical or something else, that one who takes the 
1 4 m e I:: f. ::)i:fei t h :i s ow i:i ] i £e to en hance h is 
ISi position in the hereafter, if you believe in the 
16 hereafter? 
1"1 A. dhance. I would Snjy sjive peace to 
18 themselves primarily That's the belief. 
19 Q. so it would be a personal th i ng? 
Zl1
 A. Yeah. It wonl d be a personal thing. 
211 Q • Do you consider yourself to be a religious 
person, sir? 
No. Not really. 
22 
23 
24
 0 Without identifying which, are you a member 
25 o i f o rqan i z cell i e. I, j g j o 11 a I II; Li w p i, e s e lit t: line ? 
Page 90 
BUNNY (' NEDENSCHWANDER, CSK, KPR 
23 
24 
'/ 
ji A* Yeah, I'm a member of the LDS church. 
2 Q* Would you describe yourself as active, 
3 moderately active, inactive? 
4 A. Somewhat active. 
5 Q. If you were a member of a jury panel that 
61 determined after hearing all the facts and considering 
7 the law imposed a death penalty, would you be concerned 
81 that you might be criticized by your peers, or associates 
9 because of that decision? 
101 A. No. 
11 Q. Let me ask the reverse. If you were a member 
12 of a jury panel that after considering the facts and the 
13 law on the case determined that the appropriate penalty 
14 was life imprisonment as opposed to the death penalty, 
15 would you be concerned about being criticized in that 
16 light as well? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Mr. Cole, I indicated the other day, or 
19 indicated yesterday, that there's a possibility that this 
20 case may go as long as three weeks, and that puts us at 
21 the middle of June. I didn't realize we were that close 
22J to June, but we are. This case could go that long. And 
there's a lot of factors that plug into that. That's our 
best guess on the outside. Are there any circumstances 
25
 that would prohibit you from giving your full attention 
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r~ v^.1 c r»A??A ff you're chosen as trial juror and we had 
2] to go until the middle of June? 
J A . There is one possibil i tj of somethinq that: 
4J has been planned for approximately two years My 111-laws 
5 just came home from their mission from the Philippines f 
A " M u e f LIT I1. ' "" "" planned a iiaxuiiy .reunion au wn 
7 Lake Powell area . believe, beginning June 11th. 
81 L* I believe that's a Sunday. 
9 A. I • 11 no !:: su 1: e 
ICi < • Sunday or Monday. 
1 1 MS. BERGESONi • 1 think it's a Sunday. 
12 A. That was the day that, you know, everything 
13 was supposed crank up and get going. 
14 Q. t e hopefu ] • i)f bei ng abJ e to 
attend that when JL. started at Lake Powell? 
1 6 ft Yes * 1 (affirmative). Because the 
17 ' .. » q E I tie a bi t: money J U u n k . 
18 w They are about $1,500 a week as I recall. 
19 What - -! j^uS case went a couple of days longer than that? 
20 ~;now that ,1 t would, but if i t: did, could you, join 
21 -,. group ;. some way "? 
2 2
 A. Oh, ye s. 11 h I m 11 m a i: £ i rma f:,i v e ) . 
23J Q. You wouldn 1 t loose iiiie whole week If you,, had 
to go a day late? 24 
25
 A. No, 
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-I Q. Any other problems that might interfere with 
2 your ability to serve as a trial juror in this case? 
J A. Well, my primary occupation requires me to be 
4 out-of-state quite a bit, and I do have responsibilities 
5 as far as, you know, making contact with my dealers, and 
6 et cetera. So how my employer would feel about that, I'm 
7 not sure, but I'm sure he would consider the 
8 circumstances. 
9 Q» If that became a problem, I have some 
10 leverage in that regard. 
11 A. I thought you may. 
12 Q. And as a matter of fact, all jurors are 
13 protected by law in this State. And while I realize that 
14 there's some subtleties that you may not be able to 
15 control, the courts don't stand for a minute anyone being 
16 prejudiced by having to — as far as their employment is 
17 concerned, by having to serve because the person doesn't 
18 have a choice. 
19
 A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
20
 Q. So we're very, very sensitive to that, and 
21 usually employers, even those that are very unreasonable, 
22
 once they get a phone call from the Judge tend to get 
23J real reasonable. So, — and besides, as I recall your 
position, it's one of considerable importance. And I 24 
25
 think your employer isn't going to prejudice his business 
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r%_**mffmCt'inct you But in any event, if that became a 
.Qbltrr1/ i i :i.i:i Id work it out. All right* Very good. 
Shepherd, anything further? 
MR. SHEPHERD: 
EXAMINATION OF MR. COLE 
ly Mr- Shepherd: 
Q. Prior to being picked... on this jury panel, in 
the p a s t 11 rf v«' y" '111 "" v (J in 11 ad i K:t , a s i o n t ::: h a e s e \: i o 111 • 
discussions with your friends hbout the death penalty? 
A. Yeah the past, we have You know, 
there's - = I, i.mey t Ilia t, ei I: he ~, 
you know, customers lients, friends, we'll have 
discussions on — we've had discussions on death penalty. 
Q # Tn +-b^  course of those discussions, what has 
been important * . respect to making the 
deci si on. . , as to whether or not yrm 
favored it or didn't favor ^ * 
& I really feel the most important thing to me 
concernmq the death penalty in thai if is ILilie atonement 
for the person who had committed the crime. For me, if I 
— if it was myself, and I happened to take someone elses 
H f e I "! ior , I : t:i i I iik , 1 wt i :i ] cii 1 ii ke t o J i v e w L Iti t ha t, t;c t i, 
the rest of my life. L think r ^ more punishment to do 
that than actual" e iny 1 JI 
Are there any other things that would be a 
BUNNY "• NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR 
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jl major concern to you in making that kind of decision? 
21 A. Mo. 
3 MR. SHEPHERD: Thank you, I have no further 
41 questions. 
5 THE COURT: Ms. Bergeson? 
61 EXAMINATION OF MR. COLE 
7 By Ms. Bergeson: 
81 Q. This like an atonement for the other person 
9 idea, is this something — how have you come to feel this 
10 way? 
11 A. It's just a personal feeling. It's something 
12 that I, you know, it's something I feel that the 
13 punishment should fit the crime. And whether, you know, 
14 it's not that, you know, you want to take the rights away 
15 from different people, it's something that life is the 
16 most important thing here upon this earth, and for 
17 someone to take it away, then that should be repaid by 
18 the most valuable thing that you may be able to give, and 
19 that is your own life. And I think that's how I 
20 basically feel about it. 
21
 Q. Okay. So that if you're convinced that 
22 somebody else has intentionally murdered another — 
23| A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
Q. — then you would feel that the proper 
penalty in terms of the person's ability to be salvaged 
24 
25 
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l\ would be the death penalty? 
21 ,,,,...,....
 w a y : intentionally, maybe 
3 • . 'mean by that 
> know, - nurder came about: If it was 
gruesome, preplanned, and a horrible way to cii.p, yew, IC 
w < lit: ] • ::i fee] \ e:i: 5 strongly for that. If I t was primarily 
-• if it was in anger, or something beyond the control of 
the person, well, I IIMII I wunul ha\e. I o nil back mui 
thin k, and say* well, this person was not in control of 
himself, and maybe he needs mental, or physical help, and 
tJirii H U H v i uipi m / f » in m e a n , 1 iuiiiiii1 iii.rii*f* i 1) w a s t e a l i f e 
because of a person being sick. But when someone does It 
purposefully, then I have, y ou know, he's mentally okay, 
1*1 ami everyr-hing i-vi.se is, y ou know, he made that choice. 
15 And so when he made that choice, I think he should know 
16 -... should have known what the conseqi lences ;#e;i: e go i rig to 
1 7 l,i 
18 Q. Okay. W e i ] , net s assume that there is a — 
19 a person acts somewhi 1 n|,I\pi,,1 - iat it's not 
20 as malicious as what you've described. Would you still 
21 think personally that the person should atone for the 
22 other, c: i s 1 ij 1 a t — 
23 . A . If he i s a sane person, and i t happened — i f 
24J i t was not c IOW should T exp l a in t h i s ? If in wiis in01: 
a gi: tiesorae deatr mean — you know, i f I t was just 25 
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il someone shooting someone else because of being out of 
2| control, then I really feel that a second look, as far as 
3 the death penalty should be — should occur. I just 
4 don't feel that, you know, just because a life was taken 
51 that it should be taken* If — but if it was taken 
61 purposefully, and with afore thought, and everything 
71 else, yes, I do. I think the life should be taken. 
81 Q. Have you ever — you've said that you've 
91 never opposed the death penalty? 
10 j A. No. 
11 Q. Have you ever given any serious question to 
12 the wisdom of it? Have you ever had any doubts about 
13 you're view? 
141 A. No. 
15 Q. That's a solid thing? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. You indicated to Judge Hanson that you were 
18 in favor of it? 
19
 A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
20
 Q. And I gather from what you've been telling me 
21 that that would be strongly in favor of it? 
221 A. Uh huh (affirmative). That's true. 
Q. Not somewhat? 
A. That's — that's right. Strongly. 
Q. Now, let me ask again. I know we've gone 
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23 
24 
25 
1 
2 
24 
25 
l|)l|IIP, , i ,..l,l. Je "ML ' r! LI,,, , r1 , d e u .:,.i • tie a t o n e m e n t 
for the person, does that have any religious basis for 
31 yon? 
4I A . I think so, l think so think somewhere 
5| back in my childhood, or whatever, you know think 
61 there are some Scriptures, you know, dealing * i liat;. 
7 And I Lliiiik ml " :« probably part of my upbringing* 
81 Q. Kind of an eye for an eye type — 
91 A . N o . N o t ~ i I:' «i Nii.illy d i f f e r e n t ' I'ti's n o t 
10 an eye for an eye, it's atonement for a life primarily is 
11 what it is. It's not an eye for an eye. I think there's 
12 other punishmeivl i I hat die • that can he worse. 
13 0. LiLke what? 
14 |IJ" L i v i n g w i t h i t . 
15 J i|e imprisonment then? 
161 Jh huh (affirmative!). 
Q. Might be worse than death, | I'-nalty? 
A. i"b /affirmative). Especially — 
1
 depending on the circumstances, and what came about. I 
m a t c ID«:J i |i>eii(j J i. "i1 i. Lid i w o u l d a c t u a l l y b e 
t.han having to have your life taken. 
22
 Q. Do think that the death penalty 
23J is appropriate >es ot.lier than,, murder? 
A No. 
Q. L e t ' s assume we have cin i n t e n t i o n s J aoraewhai 
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J malicious homicide. Would you be willing, or able, I 
2 think you'd probably be willing, but would you be able in 
3 all honesty to consider any information, good information 
4 about the person to persuade you that something other 
51 than death was appropriate? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. So in your view, once you've made that 
81 threshold determination that this is a — what you've 
9] described as a malicious, intentional, planned 
10 intentional type of homicide, you wouldn't be able to 
11 consider life? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Do you — let's assume that you felt that you 
14 had concluded that the homicide was committed say under 
15 extreme — under distress, or without control? 
16 A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
17 Q. Do you consider yourself a leader or a 
18 follower? 
19
 A. I think a leader. 
20
 Q. Do you feel that if you say were in the 
21 minority in a group situation, having different feelings 
22
 than the vast majority, do you think — how do you think 
23
 you'd respond to a situation like that? Would you 
24
 question your judgment? Would you sit back and take 
25
 another look? What would you do? 
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A. I've always been outspoken, and I would 
re a l l y let p e o p l e k n o w wlidl, my |irtr i u a Jar feelings wer e 
3! - :he matter. And If I felt that: a person was innocent, 
41 'Urtml up for that right, and say, this is how J 
. eally feel. This is how T ye 1 ill Mi ij liaci.s, aiicn I think 
•*.e - ..nnocent. If I feel the-person is guilty, well, 
w o n I, I .nii-n1 lii" «" 1 ,. j u i l t y . 
4 [J So you won't question your own judgment< I • :)ii 
i feel pretty solid about your own judgment? 
0 A. judgment. 
111 Everyone does. Then it -•- then the thing - ^ *« t go 
back ov er the facts, and try to find out where you do 
111 have questions. And 1.11 en yon Inave yon know a crime 
* - is murder, anything else! it's very serious. And 
i"l.'M "K- w udu u be taken lightly Something 
1
 *> l think that you have to weigh ail , h* in ",| y •! " i1"1' 
17 try to make t* *• - judgment possible. 
18| Q. know in" have yn i ever had any 
19 connection with exposure to people with mental health 
20 problems? 
21
 A* Yes. 
22
 Q In what context? 
23
 A. I have a brother-in-law that is manic 
24
 depressive. 
'
51 j. And how do you feel about that? 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
23 
A. There are times I'd love to bonk him in the 
nose, but — it's been very hard on my wife and I, 
because we've been the surrogate parents to, you know, my 
in-laws have been in the Philippines, and I understand 
that it is a medical problem, and not, you know a 
physical problem — a mental problem. It is a medical 
problem that he has a chemical imbalance, and he has a 
tough time making correct judgements. And so I have to 
be understanding, and try to help him, you know, the best 
that I can. I mean everyone only has certain limits they 
can go to. But seems like I do have a little bit more 
than the average, and I understand the situation. 
Q. Do you have faith in psychologists, and 
psychiatrists? 
A. Good ones. Let's put it that way. There are 
some out there that I myself wouldn't go see. But there 
are other good ones that do a very good job. 
Q. Have you ever felt personally with problems 
in your own life that you might be compelled, or feel 
like you'd want to go see a counselor? 
A. Oh, sure. I think everyone does at one time 
in their life. I think counseling is good. Being able 
to get things off your chest, and have someone else take, 
24
 you know, an outsider's look at you, help direct you. 
5
 Q. Have you ever gone to a counselor? 
Page 101 
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR 
J A. No. I haven't. Not yet. 
2I Q. Maybe after today? 
3 A. Yes. 
J Q . if you were selected as a juror in this case, 
51 tell me maybe some of the things that would make you a 
51 good juror in your view. 
7 A. I've always been fair. I listen. I've 
8 always had the capability of being able to weigh the 
91 facts, you know, whether it's — whatever it is. I just 
10 — you know. The most important thing, I've always been 
11 fair. 
12 Q. What do you think might be some of your 
13 poorer qualities, if any? 
14 A. Oh, I have many. 
15 THE COURT: As far as jury service is 
16 concerned. 
17 A. As jury service? 
18 THE COURT: If there are any. Limit it just to 
19 that. 
20 A . Maybe sleeping in court. I think all of us 
21 do have a certain amount of prejudice within ourselves, 
22 J and I think whether or not we feel it consciously, you 
know, it's always there, subconsciously. I think, you 
241 know, that could be one of my faults, because my 
25 background of being brought up is obeying the law, and 
Page 102 
BUNNY C. NEUENSCHWANDER, CSR, RPR 
• I doing what I'm supposed to. And I, you know, I learned 
71 quite a bit in the last few years having teen-agers that 
3| you have to learn tolerance, and understanding. And 
41 forgiveness, and et cetera, all the way. And I think 
51 being the type of father I've been, you know, I've lacked 
5 in some of those areas. And I think that's one of those 
7 areas. I may be too strict because, you know, a law is a 
8 law, and you should obey it. 
91 Q. (By Ms. Bergeson) Okay. Let me ask one final 
10 question. Let's assume the situation where you have 
11 concluded that maybe a person acts out of control. 
12 A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
13 Q. But you have information that they've acted 
14 repeatedly out of control. And assume that prior acts of 
15 violence. Prior acts say even of homicide, say repeated 
16 homicides in the worst situation. How with that impact 
17 what you've told us already? 
18 J A. If facts were brought that that person acted 
out of control on continuous, you know, previous 
occasions, and that person sought professional help, and 
21 they still, you know, it still occurred, well then I 
22J would blame it on the person. If no professional help 
came in, then I would say that that person needs some 
24
 type of professional help. I think I would be more 
25
 lenient as far as my judgements would be towards that 
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kind of person for the simple reason, you know, there 
again, we all have to learn tolerances, and forgiveness, 
and we have to weigh the facts. And I think that if it 
can be proven that that person does have a problem, then 
I think you have to look at that. 
MS. BERGESON: Okay. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Anything further from the State? 
FURTHER EXAMINATION OF MR. COLE 
91 By Mr. Shepherd:. 
Q. Let me ask just one more question. You've 
expressed some fairly strong opinions regarding the death 
penalty when you feel it would be appropriate. If you 
came to the situation where you subjectively felt the 
death penalty was necessary, or appropriate, and at the 
same time you felt intellectually that the court's 
instructions led you to doubt that under the court's 
instructions it should be a death penalty, what would 
your decision be? 
A. You said the court's instructions that it 
should be a death penalty? 
Q. It should not be a death penalty, but you 
felt it subjectively should. 
A. Like I say, a law is a law, and the man 
sitting on the bench is the head honcho. I really feel 
that I'd have to go with the judgment of the Judge. 
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MR. SHEPHERD: Thank you. 
A. I would have to. Because he and yourself 
know more about the law than I do. And I would have to 
rely upon his judgment. 
MR. SHEPHERD: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Cole, thank you very much. The 
way we're handling this is we'll make a determination 
later as to what prospective jurors need to return to 
determine who will finally be on this panel. And so let 
me ask you to do this: Unless you hear from us to the 
contrary, let me ask you to return to this courtroom on 
next Wednesday at 9 a.m. 
MR. COLE: Okay. 
THE COURT: If for some reason we determine 
that you cannot serve in this case, then I'll have one of 
my court personal call you so you don't have to make a 
17 trip in here for nothing. 
MR. COLE: Thank goodness. 
THE COURT: I appreciate it, and thank you 
for your talent and effort so far. 
(Juror left the room) 
THE COURT: Any challenge for cause for Mr. 
Cole? 
MR. SHEPHERD: State will pass for cause. 
THE COURT: What say the defendant with regard 
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to the challenge for cause? 
I MS. BERGESON: Your Honor, we would challenge 
I for cause. I think that this juror — Mr. Cole made a 
A few statements, I think, that indicate that he is likely 
*I to impose the death penalty without any regard to 
f I mitigation in the circumstance where an intentional and 
71 as he described it malicious homicide has occurred. And 
$\ once he was able to conclude that, that he wouldn't be in 
91 a position to — of being able to weigh any mitigation. 
10 I think that's an expression clearly that he couldn't 
11 follow the law, even though he didn't say that. I think 
12 that he would be unable to do that. 
13 In addition, he's expressed some feelings about 
14 atonement, some religious grounding for that, and clearly 
15 a feeling that continues in his life that an individual 
16 who has killed needs to atone for the person's — t h e 
17 victim's death. And I think that that's an indication 
18 that that personal bias, that apparently very deeply felt 
19 personal feeling would weigh into this process. Those 
20 things taken in combination, I think indicate that he 
21 would not be able to consider his duty — do his duty 
22 under the law. 
23
 THE COURT: The defendant's objection to — the 
24J defendant's challenge for cause to juror number four, Mr. 
Cole, is overruled. Mr. Cole is an acceptible juror. 25 
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ADDENDUM B 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assn. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff 
-v-
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant 
FORMAL REQUEST FOR 
DISCOVERY PURSUANT 
TO RULE 16 OF THE 
RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
Case No. 860011545 
COMES NOW the Defendant, RALPH MENZIES 
by and through his attorney, NANCY' BERGESON 
and requests the following material be provided to him/her as 
discovery no later than three days prior to preliminary hearing 
now set for the 17th day of March , 19 86 To wit: 
1. All police reports and investigations concerning 
the above-entitled case; 
2. All written or recorded statements of the defendant 
and co-defendant(s), if any; 
3. The criminal record of the defendant or felony 
convictions of any witnesses to be called by the prosecution; 
4. All evidence tending to negate the guilt of the 
defendant; 
5. All evidence tending to mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant? 
0000; 
6- All evidence tending to mitigate tne degree 01 w e 
offense for reduced punishment; 
7. All physical evidence taken and all investigative 
analysis done on any evidence in the above-entitled case; 
as provided in Rule 16, Section 77-35-(5)(b), the State shall 
make all above disclosures as soon as practicable following the 
filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. 
DATED this 5th day of March , IS 86
 m 
Respectfully submitted, 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Office of the 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 5t;h day of March , 19 86 -
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AjijL 3ro Dist Court 
" * Deoaty ClefK 
BROOKE C. WELLS, #3421 
and FRANCES M. PALACIOS, #2502 
Attorney for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO REQUIRE THE 
STATE OF UTAH TO DISCLOSE 
POTENTIAL PENALTY PHASE 
WITNESSES 
Case No. CR86-887 
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO 
Defendant, RALPH LEROY MENZIES, by and through his 
counsel of record, BROOKE C. WELLS and FRANCES M. PALACIOS, 
hereby moves this Court for an Order requiring the State of 
Utah to disclose all witnesses the State intends to call should 
a penalty phase in this case be required. This written motion 
supplements the oral motion made by Defendant during a hearing 
held January 22, 1988. Defendant argues that such information 
is crucial to his defense of the charge of Capital Murder 
pending against him and is required pursuant to the previously 
filed Motion to Discover and Subsequent Order of this Court 
granting such Discovery. Although the State has provided 
defendant a witness list, it does not include potential penalty 
phase witnesses. 
DATED this day of February, 1988. 
BROOKE C. WELLS FRANCES H., ^ ALACIOS 
Attorney for Defendant Attorney for Defendant 
MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111 this day of February, 1988. 
DELIVERED BY 
FEB 0 21988 
T. J. WENNERGREN 
- 2 -
"fl ft •;• „ 
BROOKE C. WELLS (#3421*) ~ "*"' 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS (#2502) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Otah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant 
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION 
TO DISCOVER 
Case No, CR86-887 
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO 
The defendant, by and through his attorneys of record, 
BROOKE C. WELLS and FRANCES M. PALACIOS, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-16 (1953 as amended) and the Due Process clauses of the 
Constitutions of Utah and the United States, request that the State 
of Utah disclose the following information which is in existence 
within either the state or federal court systems. Specifically, 
defendant request disclosure of all psychological, psychiatric or 
physical evaluations or any other assessments, including presentence 
reports,which have been completed on Walbpr Britton. 
DATED this o day of January, 1988. 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant 
FRANCES M. P A L A C I O S T 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this day of January, 1988. 
DELIVERED BY 
JAN 6 - 1988 
D. LOYOLA 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ERNIE JONES 
RICHARD G. MACDOUGALL 
Deputy County Attorneys 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
H L i r '.U CLERKS OFFICE 
C-!: l:.:.a County (jtsft 
FzJ 3 198B 
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Sy 
^ Oepuiy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant. 
POTENTIAL WITNESSES FOR 
THE STATE DURING THE 
PENALTY PHASE 
Case No. CR 86-887 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno 
Comes now the State of Utah by and through its attorneys, 
Ernie Jones and Richard G. MacDougall and provides the defense with 
the following witnesses which may be called during the penalty 
phase of the trial. 
Vi Lealeifalea, 5703 Cherry Avenue Apt. E4 
Long Beach, CA 90805 
Carl McBrayer, 5254 Sunglow Circle 
Salt Lake City, UT 84118 
Beverly Tischer, Utah State Prison - Records 
PO Box 250, Draper, UT 84020 
Ed Colbert, Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office - ID 
Charles Illsley, Metro Narcotics 
Byron Stark, Clerk of the Third District Court 
250 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Potential Witnesses for 
the State During the 
Penalty Phase 
CR 86-887 
Page 2 
Myrna Schultz, Clerk, of J.P. Court 
2001 South State Rm S4200, Salt Lake City, UT 
84190-1500 
David E. Yocom, Salt Lake County Attorney 
2001 South State Rm S3400, Salt Lake City, UT 
84190-1200 
Greg Bown, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
231 East 400 South Fourth Floor, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84111 
DATED this 5 day of February, 1988. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
7 
£RNTE J O N E 3 — r 
Deputy County/Attorney 
M^^tS^ ^ JDOUGALL 
Deputy County Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 3rA day of February, 1988, 
I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Potential 
Witnesses for the State during the Penalty Phase to Frances 
Potential Witnesses for 
the State During the 
Penalty Phase 
CR 86-887 
Page 3 
Palacios and Brooke Wells, Attorneys for Defendant, at the address 
stated below. 
Secretary a r y 3 
FRANCES PALACIOS 
BROOKE WELLS 
Attorneys for the Defendant 
Legal Defender Association 
333 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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BEARABLE AND BEING DECENT THROUGH ALL THIS. 
I WANT TO THANK MY SISTER AND FAMILY FOR 
ALL THE LOVE AND SUPPORT THEY HAVE SHOWN ME FOR THIS. I 
WANT TO THANK MY ATTORNEYS AND FRIENDS, FRANCES AND 
BROOKE AND KATHY, INVESTIGATOR, KEITH, BETH, KARL, AND 
JOHN FOR ALL THE WORK AND SUPPORT THEY GAVE. 
I ALSO WANT TO THANK DR. DECARIA FOR HIS 
EFFORTS IN THIS. I WANT TO THANK MY FRIENDS, ROBIN, KIM, 
SID AND GILBEY FOR STANDING BY ME, FOR BEING MY FRIENDS. 
I THANK MR. MAC DOUGALL AND MR. BERGAN FOR 
THEIR WORK ON THIS CASE. EVEN THOUGH I'M INNOCENT, I 
THANK THEM FOR DOING THEIR JOB. THE STATE COULD NEVER 
HAVE TRIED THIS SUCCESSFULLY WITHOUT THEIR HARD WORK ON 
THE CASE. 
UH, I DON'T KNOW WHAT ELSE TO SAY. THANK 
YOU. 
THE COURT: OKAY. IS THERE ANY LEGAL 
REASON SENTENCE SHALL NOT BE PRONOUNCED AT THIS TIME? 
MS. WELLS: I KNOW OF NO LEGAL REASON, YOUR 
HONOR. 
THE COURT: THIS IS SOMEWHAT LENGTHY, SO 
YOU MAY BE SEATED THERE INSTEAD OF HAVING THE DEFENDANT 
STAND. 
BUT AS YOU ARE PROBABLY AWARE, THERE WAS A 
GREAT DEAL OF TESTIMONY, AND BOTH THE ATTORNEYS FOR THE 
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1 STATE AND THE DEFENDANT DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB. THEY 
2 WERE VERY THOROUGH, EFFICIENT, METICULOUS, AND THE COURT 
3 TRIED ITS VERY BEST TO GO OVER ALL THE MATERIAL THAT WAS 
4 I PRESENTED TO THE COURT. 
AND I FOUND THAT THE PRISON RECORDS 
APPARENTLY WERE NOT FILED IN THEIR ORDER. SO AS I WENT 
THROUGH IT, THE NOTES THAT I TOOK ARE NOT IN 
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, AND THAT IS ESSENTIALLY HOW THEY 
WILL BE PRESENTED, NOT IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER. 
BUT I WILL GO OVER THE AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES FIRST, AND THEN THE MITIGATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES, AND INTERSPERSED IN THE AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES MAY BE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES BECAUSE AS 
I MENTIONED, THE NOTES WERE NOT IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER. 
AND SOME OF THE NOTES THAT I TOOK, I DID 
NOT PLACE IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER, AND I DID NOT HAVE A 
CHANCE TO PLACE IT BACK IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER BECAUSE I 
TOOK IT ALL BY LONGHAND. 
IN STARTING WITH THE AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES, I WILL START WITH THE NATURE OF THE CRIME. 
ONE, UNDER 76-5-202(D), "THE HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED WHILE 
THE ACTOR WAS ENGAGED IN THE COMMISSION OF, ATTEMPT TO 
COMMIT OR FLIGHT AFTER COMMITTING OR ATTEMPTING TO COMMIT 
AN AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING." 
TWO, UNDER 76-5-202(7)(F), "THE HOMICIDE 
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WAS COMMITTED FOR PECUNIARY OR OTHER PERSONAL GAIN." 
THREE, 76-5-202(H), "THE ACTOR WAS 
CONVICTED OF A FELONY INVOLVING THE USE OF THREAT OR 
VIOLENCE TO A PERSON." 
FOUR, 75-5-202(1)(I), "THE HOMICIDE WAS 
COMMITTED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PREVENTING A WITNESS FROM 
TESTIFYING. 
FIVE, 76-2-2(Q), "THE HOMICIDE" — OR THAT 
MIGHT BE (G). NO, THAT MIGHT BE (Q), "THE HOMICIDE WAS 
COMMITTED IN AN ESPECIALLY HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS, CRUEL 
MANNER DEMONSTRATED BY SERIOUS BODILY INJURY TO THE 
VICTIM BEFORE DEATH." 
THEN PRIOR CRIMINAL HISTORY, 
76-3-207(2)(A), ONE, THERE WAS AN EXTENSIVE JUVENILE 
COURT RECORD FROM 4-13-66, AT THE AGE OF SEVEN WHEN HE 
WAS INITIALLY REFERRED ESSENTIALLY BECAUSE HE NEEDED TO 
HAVE A PLACE TO STAY, UP UNTIL APPROXIMATELY DECEMBER 1ST 
18 I OF 1975, AND IT MAY BE SOMETIME IN 1976. IN BETWEEN THAT 
19 TIME, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 3 8 REFERRALS MADE. 
20 TWO, AND SOMETIME IN 1976, HE WAS CERTIFIED 
21 TO THE DISTRICT COURT. 
22 THREE, THERE WAS EXTENSIVE CRIMINAL RECORD. 
23 WHILE IN ELY, NEVADA, HE WAS COMMITTED TO THE NEVADA 
24 YOUTH TRAINING CENTER, RELEASED DECEMBER '74 ON PAROLE. 
25 THE PAROLE WAS REVOKED, AND HE WAS RETURNED TO THE NEVADA 
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YOUTH TRAINING CENTER APPROXIMATELY MARCH OF 1975. 
FOUR, THAT THE NEVADA YOUTH TRAINING CENTER 
WAS UNABLE TO EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH RALPH; THUS, HE WAS 
TRANSFERRED TO THE CALIFORNIA YOUTH AUTHORITY. 
FIVE, HE WENT AWOL FROM THE SHELTER IN 
NOVEMBER OF 1975 WHILE WAITING A CERTIFICATION HEARING, 
AND THAT WAS DISMISSED, HOWEVER. 
SIX, HE WAS SENT TO THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL 
WARD 56 FOR A 3 0-DAY EVALUATION. HE WAS RETURNED TO 
DETENTION WITHIN A WEEK BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT WORK WITH 
HIM WHEN HE WAS INVOLVED IN AN AWOL PLOT. 
SEVEN, JANUARY 6TH, 197 6, HE WAS COMMITTED 
TO THE STATE INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL, HELD IN THE DETENTION 
CENTER PENDING A MOTION TO CERTIFY IN 1976. 
EIGHT, ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1976, HE WAS 
CONVICTED OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, SENTENCED FIVE TO LIFE 
FOR THE ROBBERY OF THE 7-11 STORE, AND THERE WERE TWO 
ROBBERIES INVOLVED IN THAT; ONE WAS DECEMBER 21ST, 1975, 
AND THE OTHER DECEMBER 26, 1976, APPROXIMATELY A WEEK A 
PART, SAME STORE. 
NINE, JULY 11, 1978, HE ESCAPES FROM 
OFFICIAL CUSTODY, AND HE WAS CONVICTED OF THAT, SENTENCED 
ONE TO FIFTEEN YEARS. 
TEN, FEBRUARY 5TH, 1979, HE WAS CONVICTED 
OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY, SENTENCED FIVE TO LIFE. THIS IS 
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THE INSTANCE IN WHICH THE CAB DRIVER HAD HIS ARM 
MUTILATED BECAUSE OF A DISCHARGE OF THE WEAPON THAT WAS 
CARRIED. 
TWELVE, FEBRUARY 6 OF 1986, I'M NOT SURE OF 
THIS PARTICULAR DATE, BUT AROUND FEBRUARY OF 1986, HE WAS 
CONVICTED OF THEFT WHICH WAS A MISDEMEANOR, AND THEN 
FEBRUARY, AGAIN, 1986, CONVICTED OF THEFT AND ANOTHER 
MISDEMEANOR. HE WAS RELEASED ON A PRETRIAL MOTION TO BE 
SENTENCED ON MARCH 11, 1986, DURING WHICH TIME THE MURDER 
OF MAUREEN HUNSAKER OCCURRED ON FEBRUARY 24, 1986. 
THIRTEEN, FROM THE TIME THE DEFENDANT WAS 
APPROXIMATELY SEVEN YEARS OLD TO THE PRESENT TIME, HE HAS 
BEEN IN SHELTER HOMES, YOUTH DETENTION FACILITIES, JAILS 
OR IN THE CUSTODY OF THE UTAH STATE PRISON WITH BRIEF 
INTERMITTENT PERIODS OF NONCUSTODIAL LIVING. 
CHARACTER, BACKGROUND, HISTORY, MENTAL 
CONDITION: THE QUESTION IS, CAN HIS ATTITUDE AND 
BEHAVIOR BE CHANGED? IF THERE ARE THE RIGHT KIND OF 
PROGRAMS, POSSIBLY. SOME OF THE ANALYSIS, THE UTAH STATE 
PRISON DOES NOT HAVE IT. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT BOTHER TO 
CHECK PROGRAMS THAT WERE AVAILABLE. THE UTAH STATE 
HOSPITAL PREVIOUSLY TURNED HIM DOWN BECAUSE HE WOULD NOT 
COOPERATE. THEY HAD PROBLEMS WITH HIM. 
DR. DECARIA SAYS IS HE HAS THE RIGHT 
THERAPISTS WITH THE RIGHT SKILLS, THEY CAN TREAT HIM. 
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THE UTAH STATE PRISON DOES NOT HAVE ONE THAT CAN DO THAT. 
THE DEFENDANT MUST HAVE THE DESIRE TO 
CHANGE. DR. DECARIA STATED THE DEFENDANT NEVER TOLD HIM 
HE WOULD; HOWEVER, IN INTERVIEWS HE OTHERWISE FELT HE WAS 
AMENABLE. 
HE IS A THREAT TO SOCIETY. THE DEFENDANT 
WILL GET EVEN WITH THE S.O.B. WHO PUT HIM IN JAIL AND 
OTHERS AT OTHER TIMES. 
THE PAROLE REPORT INDICATES HE WAS A 
CHANGED MAN FOR THE BETTER, MUCH IMPROVEMENT. HOWEVER, 
13 MONTHS AFTER PAROLE, HE COMMITTED THEFTS; 18 MONTHS 
AFTER, HOMICIDE. 
DR. PATRICIA SMITH HAS QUESTIONED 
DR. DECARIA'S METHODS, NO PROJECTIVE TESTS. SHE FELT 
THIS WAS NECESSARY. 
OTHER EVALUATIONS FROM PSYCHIATRIC SOCIAL 
WORKERS OR PH.D. OR MASTER PSYCHOLOGISTS AND 
PSYCHIATRISTS — ALL WHO HAVE REACHED THEIR OWN TESTING 
METHODS OR USED THEIR OWN TESTING METHODS. 
ALCOHOL AND DRUG USE, AND THIS WAS IN THE 
P.S.I. REPORT TO JUDGE LEARY BY FLINT J. MOLNER: HE 
CONSUMED BEER OR BRANDY ANYTIME FINANCES COULD AFFORD. 
DRUGS BY INJECTION OR INTRAVENOUS USE: 
HEROIN, SPEED, ACID, MESCALINE; COCAINE, T.H.C., ANY 
OTHER NARCOTIC DRUG HE CAN GET HIS HANDS ON. 
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HE HAS DONE ODD JOBS AS A MECHANIC; HAS NO 
FORMAL JOB OF ANY TYPE. SUPPORTS HIMSELF THROUGH 
CRIMINAL ACTIVITY. 
NICOLE ARNOLD IN 198 6 SMUGGLED A 
SCREWDRIVER INTO THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL. IN A SHAKEDOWN 
OF THE CELL, THERE WAS A DUSTPAN HANDLE MADE INTO A SHARP 
INSTRUMENT. 
THE JAILERS TESTIFIED OF THE DIFFICULTY HE 
SAID HE COULD CAUSE JAILERS AND OTHER INMATES. 
AND JULY 22, 1978, HE WAS ARRESTED WITH A 
FALSE I.D. 
YOUTH: AT THE PRESENT TIME, HE IS NEITHER 
A CHILD NOR A TEENAGER. HE IS AN ADULT. HE MAY BE 
IMPAIRED BY SOME DEFICITS, BUT CAPABLE OF ANSWERING TO 
THESE CHARGES AND ANY PENALTY. 
ANY OTHER FACTORS, 76-3-207(9). AGAIN, THE 
DEFENDANT HAS SCARRED THE LIVES OF TOO MANY PEOPLE, 
18 MAUREEN HUNSAKER, HER FAMILY, AND PARENTS. CARL W. 
19 MC BRAYER, VALFOA SAUNIEA LEALAITAFEA. 
2 0 LIFE IMPRISONMENT IS NO GUARANTEE. THE 
21 BOARD OF PARDONS MAY RELEASE OR PAROLE IN SPITE OF 
2 2 RECOMMENDATIONS. HE MAY ESCAPE. AVERAGE COMMITMENT 2 0 
2 3 YEARS. DEFENDANT IN FOR TWO FIVE-TO-LIFE•S AND OUT IN 
2 4 SIX YEARS. 
2 5 HE HAS HAD POOR MOTHERING, POOR CHILDHOOD, 
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1 AND IN THIS INSTANCE, THE VICTIM — HIS ACTIVITIES WERE 
2 COLD AND CALCULATED. 
3 ELEVEN TO TWELVE HOURS FEAR AND ANXIETY TO 
4 BE FREE AS PROMISED. ELEVEN TO TWELVE HOURS WAITING, 
5 HANDCUFFED, DOESN'T KNOW WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN. 
6 LIGATURE, ONE SCREAM. NO HELP. THROAT CUT. DEFENDANT 
7 WATCHES HIS VICTIM DIE, REMOVED HANDCUFFS, AND WALKED 
8 AWAY. 
9 DEFENDANT HAS NOT CHANGED FOR OTHER JUDGES. 
10 THE DEFENDANT'S LETTER WAS UNSOLICITED. ATTEMPTED TO 
11 MANIPULATE. HISTORY SHOWS NO RESPECT FOR THIS OR OTHER 
12 COURTS. 
13 PROPORTIONALITY: TILLMAN CASE IS NOT A 
14 CONSIDERATION. COSTS, STATE V. NORMAN CASE STILL SAYS 
15 NOT A CONSIDERATION. 
16 THEN, IN THE P.S.R., FLINT MOLNER: THE 
17 COURT EXTRACTED SOME INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY RELATING 
18 TO TESTS THAT WERE GIVEN TO HIM. THEY INDICATED THAT THE 
19 JUVENILE COURT, THE FIRST REFERRAL WAS MAY 4TH OF 19 68 
2 0 BECAUSE OF LACK OF CARE. IT WAS PARENTS FAULT. 
21 THE REPORT INDICATES FIRST STEP-PARENT WAS 
22 1964, FRANCIS CLIFFORD PORTER, MEMBER OF A MOTORCYCLE 
23 GANG; DIVORCED 1967. 1968, SECOND STEP-FATHER, OLIVER 
24 CLINTON STEVENS. MOTHER DIED IN 1972 OF LEUKEMIA. 
25 THESE REPORTS ALL INDICATED THAT THE FIRST 
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STEP-FATHER WAS VERY CRUEL AND BEAT HIM AND WAS VERY 
DEMANDING, UNLOVING. THE SECOND STEP-FATHER WAS VERY 
STRICT, ALSO BEAT HIM, AND THE DEFENDANT HAD EXTREME 
DIFFICULTY WITH BOTH STEP-FATHERS. 
HE MARRIED MARIA THAYER AUGUST 18, 197 6, 
AND I WAS NOT ABLE TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE WAS EITHER 
DIVORCED OR THE MARRIAGE WAS ANNULLED APPROXIMATELY 
APRIL 5 OF 19- — WELL, COULDN'T BE RIGHT. POSSIBLY, 
APRIL 5 OF 1977. 
JUVENILE COURT WAS UNABLE TO CURB OR 
REHABILITATE HIM. HE IS WELL ABOVE AVERAGE IN 
INTELLECTUAL ABILITY. CONSIDERS HIS OWN NEEDS AND IS 
HIGHLY MANIPULATIVE. 
DRUGS AND ALCOHOL ARE PROBLEMS. DEFINITELY 
HAS POTENTIAL FOR DANGER FOR SOCIETY. EXTENSIVE 
LONG-TERM TREATMENT IN STRUCTURED SETTING. 
DR. TROY GILL, MARCH 1ST, '76: ANTISOCIAL 
PERSONALITY, PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE PERSONALITY. HIGH RATE 
OF IMPULSIVITY, IRRESPONSIBILITY, AND IMMATURE AND 
DEMANDING BEHAVIOR. 
LEWIS L. BOONE, MURRAY JORDAN MENTAL 
HYGIENE CENTER: PSYCHOPATHIC, DEFINITE CHARACTER 
DISORDER, DEVIANT. THIS IS FEBRUARY 2 6 OF 1976, 
PUBLIC OFFENDER'S PROGRAM, UTAH STATE 
HOSPITAL DECEMBER 3RD, 1975: PROGNOSIS, VERY POOR. 
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j [NEVADA YOUTH TRAINING FACILITY, MANY i-Kuo^^. 
2 STATE HOSPITAL, DECEMBER 3RD, 1975, ADMITTED; DECEMBER 
3 10, 1975, SEPARATION. HE WAS REFERRED BY JUDGE LARSEN OF 
4 THE JUVENILE COURT. 
5 JOHN WOODS, M.D., UNIT DIRECTOR, FORENSIC 
6 PSYCHIATRY: PROGNOSIS, POOR. FINAL PSYCHIATRIC 
7 DIAGNOSIS, PERSONALITY DISORDER, ANTISOCIAL; TYPE, 
8 SEVERE. AND THIS WAS THE INCIDENT IN WHICH HE HELPED IN 
9 A SERIOUS AWOL PLOT, DECEMBER 7, 1976, DANGEROUS PATIENT, 
10 ESCAPED. THOUGHT SERIOUS TO ESCAPE FROM THE UTAH STATE 
11 HOSPITAL, WILL ESCAPE FROM ANY INSTITUTION. 
12 MARCH 15, '73, 14 YEARS OLD, PSYCHOLOGICAL 
13 EVALUATION, SPENCER L. WOODS, M.S., PSYCHOLOGIST: 
14 AGGRESSIVE, INCIDENTS INVOLVING KNIVES. HE WAS GIVEN 
15 THEMATIC APPERCEPTION TEST, M.M.P.I., AND SENTENCE 
16 COMPLETION. 
17 DULL NORMAL INTELLIGENCE ABILITY, ACADEMIC 
18 DEFICIT IN ALL AREAS; IMPULSIVITY, DISTRACTIBILITY, 
19 HYPERACTIVITY. VERIFIED PRESENCE OF ORGANIC 
20 DIFFICULTIES. NO EVIDENCE OF PSYCHOSIS, HYPOMANIC AND 
21 SOCIOPATHIC MOMENTS. POOR JUDGMENT. 
2 2 MURRAY-JORDAN-TOOELE MENTAL HEALTH OR 
23 HYGIENE CENTER. LEWIS L. BOONE, M.S.W., PSYCHIATRIC 
24 SOCIAL WORKERS INTERVIEWS 2-18-76, 2-24-76, 2-26-76, AND 
2 5 THIS, I BELIEVE, IS THE ONE IN WHICH HE WAS INSTRUCTED BY 
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JUDGE LARSEN NOT TO READ OR LOOK AT ANY OTHER PSYCHIATRIC 
OR PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORTS OR ANYTHING WRITTEN ABOUT HIM, 
AND HIS ANALYSIS IS PARANOIA, EXTREME RESISTANCE TO 
INFLUENCE, IMPULSIVITY, AND ASOCIAL SOCIOPATHIC DEFICIT 
CHARACTER DISORDER DIAGNOSIS. AND HE RECOMMENDED THAT HE 
BE RELEASED TO EITHER THE ODESSY HOUSE OR WARD 56 OF THE 
UTAH STATE HOSPITAL. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 9-16-76, A. L. 
CARLISLE, PH.D., CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST BIPOLAR 
PSYCHOLOGICAL INVENTORY, DESCRIPTIVE WORD INVENTORY, 
SHIPLEY INSTITUTE, THEMATIC APPERCEPTION TEST, AND 
SENTENCE COMPLETION TEST. SHIPLEY I.Q., NORMAL 
INTELLIGENCE. G.A.T.B., GENERAL APTITUDE TEST BATTERY, 
UPPER LEVEL, MOST AREAS. EDUCATION PERFORMANCE, 10TH, 
11TH, 12TH GRADE READING, 10TH GRADE OVERALL. NECESSARY 
CAPABILITIES TO SUCCEED IN MANY DIFFERENT AREAS. 
PERSONALITY TESTING, ANXIETY, DEPRESSION, 
SOME WITHDRAWAL, SOCIAL DEVIANCY, IMPULSIVENESS AND 
HOSTILITY. VIOLENT POTENTIAL CONSISTENT WITH PAST 
BEHAVIOR AND OTHERS' IMPRESSIONS. 
LOW TOLERANCE FOR FRUSTRATION; RELATIVELY 
LONELY; SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM WITH DRUGS. FUTURE HOPELESS, 
NEEDS HELP, IN DEPTH THERAPY NECESSARY. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, JULY 20, 1979, 
A. L. CARLISLE, PH.D., PSYCHOLOGIST: ASSESSMENT, RESULT 
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IN NORMAL INTELLIGENCE, VOCABULARY; I.Q. 106 ABSTRACT; 
I.Q. 95; TOTAL, 102. HE IS A PRIVATE PERSON, DISTANCES 
HIMSELF FROM OTHERS; CONTROLS THINGS THAT HAPPEN TO HIM. 
ATTEMPT TO CONTROL BEHAVIOR, HAS SHOWN IMPROVEMENT IN 
PAST YEAR. LESS IMPULSIVE, WILLING TO HELP OUT IN WORK, 
QUITE A FEW POSITIVE C NOTES. 
UNDERLYING ANGER, IF HE ACTS OUT IN FUTURE, 
MORE CHOICE THAN IMPULSE. WHEN HE GETS OUT, HE'LL EITHER 
STAY OUT OF TROUBLE OR MORE PROBABLY BECAUSE OF CRIMINAL 
HISTORY BECOME MORE SKILLED CRIMINAL. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT, 9-4-80, A. L. 
CARLISLE, PH.D., CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST: STRONG 
ANTISOCIAL BACKGROUND, HABITUAL PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR. 
TRYING TO CHANGE; SINCERE IN DOING SO. SHOWN DEFINITE 
IMPROVEMENT. PROGNOSIS MUCH BETTER THAN INITIALLY. 
RALPH IS RALPH. DOES JOB, COOPERATIVE, RESPECTFUL UNLESS 
HE IS PUSHED. 
BOARD OF PARDONS PROGRESS NOTE OR REPORT 
JULY 9, 1984, LADDY PRUETT, S.S.W.; COLLEEN LINDLEY, 
S.S.W. RALPH NOT AFRAID OF WORK, GOOD WORKER. OPEN 
COMMUNICATION WITH WORKER. COUNSELING ON WEEKLY BASIS. 
MAKING HONEST EFFORT TO RETURN TO SOCIETY. SISTER AND 
GRANDFATHER HAVE OFFERED A PLACE TO STAY. GOOD 
RELATIONSHIP WITH KUBOTA'S. 
REPORT PERIOD, NOVEMBER 12, '80 TO JUNE 9, 
3259 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
'81: PROGRAM HAS SOME WORK TO DO, BUT HAS MATURED 
CONSIDERABLY DURING YEARS IN PRISON. 
VOCATION, EMPLOYMENT: REGULAR WORK REPORTS 
AND COMMENTS EXCELLENT, VERY CAPABLE WORKER. WORKS MORE 
HOURS THAN AVERAGE. 
SOCIAL, PAM SOMMERALL: FOSTER SISTER 
ESTRANGED FROM FAMILY. NEGATIVE IMPACT ANYWAY. 
DISCIPLINARY, NO WRITE-UPS. BEHAVIOR 
APPROPRIATE, DRASTIC CHANGE BLOCKS. STAFF SAYS 
COOPERATIVE. 
CARLA HENNINGER, P.S.W. S.S.W; RICHARD 
BURTON, SUPERVISING SOCIAL SERVICE WORKER: NEVER ANY 
VISITS BY ANY OF HIS FAMILY, SISTER, JACKIE; AUNT KUBOTA; 
OR GRANDFATHER. 
CHRONOLOGICAL NOTES 9-15-76 TO 10-15-84: 
16 WHEN HE WAS GIVEN WORK ASSIGNMENTS, HE HAS GOOD TO 
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EXCELLENT ACTS. IN ADDITION, PUTS IN ADDITIONAL TIME 
WITHOUT PAY. VOLUNTEERS TO DO WORK. GIVEN GOOD 
RECOMMENDATIONS. 
WRITE-UPS PERIODIC. STRONG-ARM TACTICS, 
THREATS TO INMATES AND GUARDS WHEN PUSHED, POSSIBLY 
HOSTILE, THREATENING, ABUSIVE, IMPULSIVE. 
FINISHED HIS G.E.D., HELPED OTHERS, 
INMATES. COMMUNICATES BETWEEN INMATE AND STAFF. ASSUMED 
LEADERSHIP ROLE. POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE. 
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FEBRUARY 9, «73, INITIAL EVALUATION BY 
PEGGY ELLIS, A.C.S.W., PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIAL WORKER. 
IMPRESSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION: SEVERELY DISTURBED BOY 
AND NATURE OF HIS DISTURBANCE IS SUCH THAT HE DEFINITELY 
HAS POTENTIAL FOR DANGER TO SOCIETY. WITHOUT 
INTERVENTION, THIS IS A BOY WHO WILL LIKELY BE AT 
CONTINUAL ODDS WITH SOCIETY. 
THE PROGNOSIS IS NOT THE BEST AND SUCCESS 
OF REHABILITATION WOULD PROBABLY COME ABOUT ONLY AS A 
RESULT OF EXTENSIVE LONG-TERM TREATMENT IN A STRUCTURED 
SETTING. EVEN SO, THE RISK OF NOT PROVIDING TREATMENT 
OPPORTUNITY TO THIS BOY IS TOO GREAT TO IGNORE. 
TREATMENT WOULD BE COMPLICATED BY HIS FEAR 
OF CONFINEMENT AND APPARENT LOW TOLERANCE FOR STRUCTURED 
SITUATIONS. PSYCHO-THERAPY WOULD BE DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF 
HIS POOR ABILITY WITH RELATIONSHIPS AND LITTLE INSIGHT OR 
CONCERN WITH HIS PROBLEMS. MOTIVATION TO CHANGE IS 
NEGATIVE. 
IN HIS FAVOR WOULD BE HIS AGE, THE FACT, IF 
WE ACCEPT REPORTS FROM STATE HOSPITAL, SOME OF THE MORE 
SEVERE DISTURBANCES ARE OF A FAIRLY RECENT ONSET, AND HE 
HAS MADE ADEQUATE ADJUSTMENT WHILE IN DETENTION. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION, 2-9-76, ROBERT 
STRAUN, PH.D., CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST. HE WAS GIVEN THE 
M.M.P.I. IT SHOWS IMMATURE, IMPULSIVE EMOTIONALLY 
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UNSTABLE, UNRESPONSIBLE. 
TWO, ALCOHOL ABUSE AND AGGRESSION CAN 
OCCUR. THREE, CONTROL OF ANGER POOR. SENSITIVE TO 
REJECTION OR FRUSTRATION OF EGOCENTRIC DEMANDS FOR 
ATTENTION FOR APPROVAL. FIVE, JUDGMENT MAY BE 
UNDEFENDABLE UNDER STRESS. 
SIX, DIFFICULTY MAINTAINING EMOTIONAL 
EQUILIBRIUM AND INDEPENDENCE UNDER STRESS. SEVEN, 
FRUSTRATION CAN BE REACTED TO WITH IRRITABILITY AND 
DESTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR. 
RORSCHACH: ONE, ADEQUATE CONTACT WITH 
REALITY. TWO, NO SERIOUS THINKING DISORDER. THEMATIC 
APPERCEPTION TEST: ONE, DIFFICULTY MASTERING TASKS. 
TWO, SEXUAL ADJUSTMENTS. 
SENTENCE COMPLETION: STRONG-FELT NEEDS FOR 
GIRLFRIENDS. TWO, AMBIVALENCE IN HETEROSEXUAL 
RELATIONSHIPS. MAY BE ASSOCIATED WITH HOMOSEXUAL PANIC. 
SUMMARY: ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR ASSOCIATED 
WITH SEVERE SOCIAL AND VOCATIONAL MALADJUSTMENTS. 
IN PSYCHIATRIC EXAM, MARCH 1ST, '76, TROY 
GILL, M.D., PSYCHIATRIST: PROGNOSIS FOR TOTAL 
REHABILITATION IS POOR. DIFFICULT TO MAKE TREATMENT 
RECOMMENDATIONS WITH ANY DEGREE OF CERTAINTY AS TO 
SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. 
THE UTAH STATE HOSPITAL PSYCHIATRIC 
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EVALUATION, MARCH 7, '73. PROGNOSIS SHOULD BE FAIRLY 
GOOD. FINAL PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS, ORGANIC BRAIN 
SYNDROME WITHOUT PSYCHOSIS, UNDIFFERENTIATED (MINIMAL 
BRAIN DYSFUNCTION) SYNDROME BEHAVIOR DISORDER. 
ADOLESCENT WITH UNSOCIALIZED FEATURES. CONDITION OF 
PATIENT ON DISCHARGE, IMPROVED. 
ANOTHER PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AT THE UTAH 
STATE HOSPITAL IN WHICH HE WAS REFERRED FOR PULLING A 
KNIFE AND INFLICTING INJURY TO GIRL WHO TEASED HIM AND 
INDICATED HE WOULD "CUT HER GUTS OUT." 
PHILLIP WASHBURN, M.D., PSYCHIATRIST, 
CHILDREN'S WARD. FINAL PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSIS: 
ADJUSTMENT REACTION OF EARLY ADOLESCENCE WITH DEVELOPING 
PERSONALITY PATTERN DISTURBANCE, ANTISOCIAL FEATURES. 
JUNE 3, 1970, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION, 
PEUANDRA BHAGAY, M.A., D.M., S.B., PSYCHOLOGIST. AVERAGE 
NORMAL RANGE OF INTELLIGENCE. PERFORMANCE I.Q., BRIGHT 
LEVEL. NOT AGGRESSIVE, IMMATURE, EXHIBITIONIST. FAIRLY 
GOOD JUDGMENT OF SOCIAL SITUATIONS. 
UTAH STATE HOSPITAL PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION, 
JOHN C. WOOD, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRIST, DECEMBER 15, '77: 
THERE WAS A SERIOUS AWOL PLOT ON DECEMBER 7, »77, CREATED 
DIVERSIONARY TACTIC HELPING DANGEROUS PATIENT TO ESCAPE. 
EASIER TO BREAK OUT OF UTAH STATE HOSPITAL. 
ALTHOUGH UTAH STATE HOSPITAL PROGRAM GOOD 
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FOR HIM, DEFENDANT NOT READY TO PARTICIPATE. FAMILY A 
LITTLE CAUTIOUS. THREATENED SISTER WITH KNIFE. SEVERE 
FIGHTS WITH SISTER. PLACED FINALLY IN DETENTION. 
LITTLE INDICATION TOWARD CHANGE. GETS WHAT 
WANTS THE EASIEST WAY. PROGNOSIS: VERY POOR. 
DIAGNOSIS: PERSONALITY DISORDER, ANTISOCIAL; TYPE, 
SEVERE. RETURNED TO JUVENILE COURT. 
AND THEN GETTING TO THE MITIGATING, AND I 
INDICATED SOME OF THIS WOULD BE MIXED. THERE ARE 
MITIGATING FACTORS, ALSO, IN THE AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT I READ. 
ONE, 76-3-202, AS INDICATED BY DEFENSE 
COUNSEL, HE WAS UNSTABLE. INTERVENING PERIODS WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT AS FAR AS THE VICTIM WAS CONCERNED. DEATH 
OCCURRED QUICKLY WITHOUT TORTURE. CIRCUMSTANTIAL NATURE 
OF THE EVIDENCE OF FELONIES, AND, OF COURSE, THE ONLY 
WITNESS IS NOW DECEASED. 
OCCURRED WHILE DEFENDANT WAS SUFFERING FROM 
ONE, SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY DISORDER; TWO, BORDERLINE 
PERSONALITY DISORDER; THREE, ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY 
DISORDER. ALL D.M.S-IIIR AND ALSO DYSFUNCTION. 
76-3-207(2)(B). THE MURDER WAS COMMITTED 
WHILE THE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER EXTREME MENTAL OR EMOTIONAL 
DISTURBANCE, DYSFUNCTION. 
THE VICTIM WAS UNHARMED, CARL W. MC BRAYER; 
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HOWEVER, WEAPON WAS USED BOTH TIMES. TAKEN FOR RIDE 
SECOND TIME. DROPPED OFF AT AIRPORT. TOLD TO GET INTO 
DITCH OR "BLOW YOUR HEAD OFF." 
HE WAS PICKED UP — THE DEFENDANT WAS 
PICKED UP IN NEVADA AND SHOWED NO REMORSE. 
INJURY WAS UNINTENTIONAL, AND THIS IS 
VALFOA SAUNIEA LAELAITAFEA. PERPETUATED WHILE AT LARGE 
FROM ESCAPE. ALMOST SHOT ARM OFF WITH LOADED SHOTGUN. 
THE VICTIM WAS HOSPITALIZED. HAD MANY OPERATIONS. 
REMORSE, BOASTS TO JAIL INMATE, BRITTON, 
CUTTING HER THROAT WAS THE GREATEST THRILL OF HIS LIFE. 
ALLEGED BAD ACTS HAVE — THIS IS CHARACTER, 
BACKGROUND HISTORY, MENTAL CONDITION: ALLEGED BAD ACTS 
14 WERE UNPROVEN. 
UNDER 76-3-207(D), AT TIME OF MURDER THE 
CAPACITY OF THE DEFENDANT TO APPRECIATE THE CRIMINALITY 
(WRONGNESS) OF HIS CONDUCT TO THE REQUIREMENT OF LAW WAS 
SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED AS A RESULT OF EXTREME MENTAL OR 
EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE OR DYSFUNCTION. 
CHILDHOOD: ABUSE, DEATH, NO PARENTING, 
INSTABILITY. TWO COMMITMENTS, UTAH STATE HOSPITAL. 
CERTIFICATION TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON AT AGE OF 17. 
NO TREATMENT OR INTERVENTION. UTAH STATE 
PRISON EDUCATION PROGRESS, WORK SUCCESS, AND ACTIVITIES. 
HISTORY OF ALCOHOL AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE: 
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YOUTH, 27; EMOTIONAL AGE 10-12. 
ANY OTHER FACTORS, 76-3-207(G): LIFE TERM, 
SAFE FROM SOCIETY. RECOMMENDATION FROM COURT TO BOARD OF 
PARDONS. RECOMMENDATION OF PROSECUTOR TO BOARD OF 
PARDONS. 
AMENABILITY TO TREATMENT OR CHANGE. 
AVAILABILITY OF TREATMENT SOURCES. ABILITY TO ADAPT TO 
PRISON LIFE. CONTINUED FAMILY SUPPORT. 
INABILITY TO EXPRESS HIS SIDE OF THE STORY. 
EXERCISED RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY. BLACKOUTS, AMNESIA, 
FANTASY, ESCAPE CONSISTENT WITH MENTAL ILLNESS AS 
INDICATED BY DR. DECARIA. 
LIFE OR DEATH IS THE SAME, JUST THE MANNER 
OF DEATH. THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE IMPOSITION OF THE 
DEATH PENALTY. 
MANY WESTERN COUNTRIES AND STATES IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND FEDERAL COURTS DO NOT IMPOSE THE DEATH 
PENALTY. 
THE WOOD CASE, THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT 
ONE SENTENCE IS BETTER THAN THE OTHER. THERE IS NO 
CATEGORY IN RUTHLESSNESS OF CRIME. IT IS RECOGNIZED 
THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN CULPABILITY, AND THEREFORE, YOU 
HAVE THE AGGRAVATED VERSUS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT AND APPROPRIATENESS BEYOND A 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND HEARSAY IN REPORTS COULD 
NOT BE ADDRESSED. APPROPRIATENESS: IS NOT UNDEFINED. 
MURDER BY STATE. MERCY. FORGIVENESS. "THOU SHALT NOT 
KILL." 
CIVILIZED SOCIETY ELIMINATES THOSE DEEMED 
INFERIOR. ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF 
DEATH PENALTY. 
AFFIDAVITS OF ATTORNEYS. THE 
PROPORTIONALITY OF DEATH PENALTY DEPENDS ON THE 
PROSECUTOR, THE JURISDICTION, JURY, AND THE JUDGE. 
IF THERE IS DOUBT FOR ANY REASON, LIFE 
IMPRISONMENT SHOULD BE GIVEN. 
FOUR ISSUES OF THE DEATH PENALTY: ONE, 
PUNISHMENT CAN BE INCARCERATION. TWO, RETRIBUTION, EYE 
FOR AN EYE; CONSIDERATIONS OF MERCY, FORGIVENESS, 
VINDICATE DEATH, SANITY OF THE STATE VERSUS INFIRMITY OF 
THE DEFENDANT. THREE, REHABILITATION. FOUR, COST; DEATH 
PENALTY VERSUS LIFE IMPRISONMENT. 
DEFENDANT IS A HUMAN BEING. CANNOT BRING 
BACK MAUREEN HUNSAKER BY TAKING HIS LIFE. SAME WITH LOSS 
TO HER FAMILY. CANNOT PUT VALUE ON HER LIFE BY DEVALUING 
DEFENDANT'S. 
RALPH L. MENZIES DID NOT CHOOSE PATH HE HAS 
TAKEN. IT IS NOT OF HIS MAKING. HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED 
A BETTER LIFE. INSTEAD SUBJECT OF DEPRAVATION. UNABLE 
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TO CONTROL HIS BEHAVIOR. EMOTIONAL ILLNESS CAN BE 
TREATED. 
HE LOVES HIS FAMILY AND IS LOVED BY THEM. 
SUCCEEDED IN PRISON DISCIPLINE. ACHIEVED ACADEMICALLY. 
MEDIATED BETWEEN STAFF AND INMATES. HAS RESPECT AND 
LOYALTY. 
WILL THE HUMAN HEART BE MADE HARDER OR 
SOFTER BECAUSE OF HIS LIFE? AS AT THE SELBY EXECUTION, 
WILL WE OBSERVE THE PRESERVATION OF LIFE OR CELEBRATION 
OF DEATH? 
THE COURT HAS, TO THE BEST OF THE COURT'S 
ABILITY, WEIGHED AND EVALUATED THE MITIGATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. AND THE 
CONCLUSION THE COURT HAS REACHED IS THAT BASED ON THE 
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES, THE COURT 
CONCLUDES THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OUTWEIGH THE 
17 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
NOW, WE COME TO THE APPROPRIATENESS UNDER 
THE CIRCUMSTANCE. IN HIS OPENING, MR. JONES HAS STATED, 
HOW MUCH WILL THE COMMUNITY TOLERATE? HOW MANY TIMES 
MUST OR SHOULD THE DEFENDANT HAVE TO BE RETURNED TO 
PRISON? 
TWO, HOW MANY TIMES MUST PEOPLE BE 
THREATENED, PUT IN FEAR OF LIFE OR LIMB, HURT, MAIMED, 
INJURED, OR MURDERED? THREE, HOW MANY ESCAPES ARE TO BE 
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TOLERATED? FOUR, HOW MANY PAROLES WILL THE DEFENDANT BE 
ENTITLED TO? 
THE COURT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THIS 
COMMUNITY HAS BEEN PUT AT TOO MUCH RISK. THERE IS NO 
GUARANTEE THE DEFENDANT WILL NOT ESCAPE AGAIN. THERE IS 
NO GUARANTEE HE WILL NOT BE PAROLED AGAIN IN ONE YEAR OR 
THIRTY YEARS. 
THE LONG-TERM INTENSIVE TREATMENT NECESSARY 
TO REHABILITATE THE DEFENDANT IS NOT AVAILABLE AT THE 
UTAH STATE PRISON OR ANY OTHER INSTITUTION IN THIS STATE 
THAT THE COURT IS AWARE OF. 
THERE IS NO FACILITY WHERE OTHER INMATES OR 
STAFF WILL BE FREE FROM THREATS, INTIMIDATION, OR HARM 
FROM THE DEFENDANT. IF ANY REHABILITATIVE TREATMENT IS 
GIVEN, AS IT ONCE WAS GIVEN AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON 
UNSUCCESSFULLY, THERE IS NO GUARANTEE IT WILL BE 
SUCCESSFUL IN THE FUTURE. AND GIVEN SUCH OPTIONS, HOW 
WILL IT DIMINISH THE DANGER TO THOSE EXPOSED TO THE 
DEFENDANT IF HE IS TO BE "WAREHOUSED," AS THE TERM IS 
COMMONLY USED, FOR THE REST OF HIS NATURAL LIFE AT THE 
UTAH STATE PRISON. 
MY GREATEST CONCERN IS FOR THE INNOCENT 
VICTIM, THE INNOCENT VICTIM OR THE VICTIMS IN THE FUTURE 
AND HOW BEST TO PROTECT THEM. THE DEFENDANT HAS LIVED A 
LIFE OF DEPRIVATION OF LOVE, COMPANIONSHIP, MATERIAL 
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NEEDS, OPPORTUNITY FOR EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, FAMILY 
HOME, AND A NORMAL LIFE. 
HE HAS PERFORMED WELL UNDER ADVERSE 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHILE INCARCERATED. YET HIS PATTERN OF 
LIVING HAS CONSTANTLY AND CONTINUALLY EXPOSED MANY PEOPLE 
TO FEAR AND HARM. REGARDLESS OF WHERE HE RESIDES, IT IS 
UNLIKELY THE PATTERN WILL EVER CHANGE. 
CONSEQUENTLY, THIS COURT, WITH THE HEAVIEST 
OF HEARTS, MAKES THE MORE DIFFICULT AND TRYING DECISION 
THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT, THE DEATH PENALTY IS THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY, AND 
THE COURT SO ORDERS. 
ANYTHING FURTHER AT THIS TIME? 
MR. JONES: YES, YOUR HONOR. YOU NEED TO 
SET A DATE THAT SHOULD BE WITHIN 60 DAYS, AND BETWEEN 3 0 
AND 60 DAYS, OUR OFFICE WILL PREPARE THE WARRANT FOR YOUR 
SIGNATURE. 
THE COURT: DOES THE DEFENSE HAVE ANY DATE 
THAT IS MORE PREFERABLE THAN THE OTHER? 
MS. WELLS: I THINK THAT IS THE COURT'S 
DECISION, YOUR HONOR. THE COURT IS AWARE THAT DATE WOULD 
BE VACATED DUE TO AN APPEAL, SO I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO 
DO THAT WITHIN YOUR PREROGATIVE. 
THE COURT: THIRTY DAYS. 
MR. JONES: IT HAS TO BE A MINIMUM OF 3 0 
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